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Abstract
The purpose of this research was to measure the success of the Product Center
(PC) portion of the Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) reorganization initiated in
2004. The purpose of this study is threefold, (1) to determine if the 2004 AFMC Product
Center reorganization has met General Martin’s four intended objectives, (2) the
reorganizations effects on AFMC employee job satisfaction and organizational
commitment and (3) to gather some general opinions about the reorganization overall.
The literature review consisted of a detailed look at the history of AFMC, areas of
organizational culture, and gathering detailed information regarding the 2004
reorganization itself. This research measured the success of the PC portion of the
reorganization to date; assistance was solicited and provided from HQ AFMC/A8M in
development of the survey instrument for such measurement. Upon completion of
development, electronic dissemination of the survey instrument was utilized to send it to
the three AFMC PCs. Survey results were summarized and the overall conclusion
reached that the AFMC PC reorganization initiated in 2004 has had little or not impact to
date based on the opinions of PC employees who responded to the survey.
Recommendations for further research avenues are also discussed.
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CHALLENGES FACING MILITARY ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURAL
REFORM: A STUDY OF THE 2004 AIR FORCE MATERIEL COMMAND
REORGANIZATION
I. Introduction
Overview
Change management, organizational culture and organizational theory have a
strong impact on any type of reorganization. In 2004, Air Force Materiel Command
(AFMC) initiated a reorganization under the command of General Gregory S. “Speedy”
Martin. The reorganization consisted of three major change areas: Headquarters (HQ)
AFMC, transfer of installation commander responsibilities, and the Product Centers (PC)
and Air Logistics Centers (ALC). The HQ AFMC portion and the transfer of installation
commander responsibilities have been completed. The PC and ALC reorganizations are
still ongoing and are expected to be completed sometime in 2006. This thesis research
will focus on the PC portion of the reorganization. For purposes of this research, military
organizational culture narrowly focuses on AFMC.
Background
Since its creation on 11 July 1992, AFMC has remained essentially the same in
structure and mission for over 10 years. Prior to this time, reorganization occurred
continually as the military strove to unearth the best way to manage a weapon system
throughout its entire life cycle.
One of the key factors in the decision to reorganize AFMC was the 2003
realignment of Program Executive Office Responsibilities (PEO). This realignment
included Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC) at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio;
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Electronic Systems Center (ESC) at Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts; and Air
Armament Center (AAC) at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. Previously, these three PCs
were organized separately and connected indirectly to the acquisition chain of command.
In 2003, the PC commanders each assumed new roles working directly for the Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ): the ASC Commander is the PEO
for Aircraft, the ESC Commander is the PEO for Command and Control (C2), and the
AAC Commander is the PEO for Weapons and Munitions. This federally mandated
change further solidified General Martin’s belief that AFMC needed significant change
to meet the recent responsibilities assigned to the PEOs.
General Martin had four stated objectives that the reorganization was to meet:
“First, we want to strengthen support to operational commands and
warfighters in the field. AFMC’s number one job is to deliver war-winning
capabilities on time and on cost. If we can’t do this for all weapon systems
then we are adding no value. Second, we must continue supporting and
maturing the PEO realignment. This will continue the age-old debate of when
an acquisition program shifts into the sustainment phase. Third, there is a
need to structure AFMC similar to the way all other Air Force major
commands operate. The incorporation of the standard wing/group/squadron
structure will make it easier for people to understand AFMC. It will also ease
in identification of what each organization is responsible for. Fourth, we must
structure the command with a capability-based versus platform-based focus.
Rather than having separate organizations for every weapon system, they will
be grouped based on similar capabilities. Platforms can then share the
responsibility and knowledge base among similar systems.” (Martin, 2004h).

The reorganization of Headquarters (HQ) AFMC focused on the mission,
resources and support functions. There were specific areas that AFMC felt were being
neglected: capability planning, acquisition logistics, and fielding (Martin, 2004c).
Through the creation of some new divisions and a new directorate, AFMC hoped to
change this lack of oversight perception.

2

After the HQ reorganization, the next significant change occurred in March 2004
with the movement of installation commander responsibility from the PC and ALC
commanders to the Air Base Wing (ABW) commanders. Since the PC commanders
would now also occupy the role of PEOs, it was considered more important they keep
their focus on acquisition, logistics, or test and evaluation than the everyday activities of
running an installation. Traditional installation support duties and responsibilities, and
some jobs, transitioned to the respective ABW but no jobs were eliminated overall.
The standardization of PC and ALC staffs into groups, squadrons and wings was
the next challenge. This new structure was designed to clarify lines of authority,
establish command responsibility (i.e., Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)
authority), define ownership of manpower and budget resources, reduce reliance on
matrixed support and, of course, make the PCs and ALCs look like the rest of the
operational Air Force (AF). It was also hoped this new structure would make AFMC
more recognizable and easier to understand for the rest of the AF.
Problem Statement
The purpose of this study is threefold: 1) to determine if the 2004 AFMC Product
Center reorganization has met General Martin’s four intended objectives, (2) the
reorganizations effects on AFMC employee job satisfaction and organizational
commitment and (3) to gather some general opinions about the reorganization overall.

Research Objectives/Investigative Questions/Hypothesis
The research objective of this study is to gauge the success of the 2004 AFMC
Product Center reorganization by surveying personnel assigned to the PCs. It was
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hypothesized that the reorganization had been successful in all areas to date.
Investigative questions to support this objective include the following:
1) Has the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization succeeded in strengthening
support to operational commands?
2) Has the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization succeeded in strengthening
support to warfighters in the field?
3) Has the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization supported the PEO
realignment?
4) Has the PEO realignment matured as a result of the 2004 AFMC Product Center
reorganization?
5) Has the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization successfully restructured
AFMC similar to the way all other Air Force major commands operate?
6) Has the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization created a capability-based
versus platform-based focus?
7) As a result of the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization, are AFMC Product
Center employees satisfied with their jobs?
8) As a result of the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization, are AFMC Product
Center employees more or less committed to their organizations?
9) This study identified areas related to the reorganization that may need additional
attention.
Methodology
The methodology employed by this study was a web-based survey administered
to AFMC employees (military, civilian and contractor) at the three PCs: Aeronautical
Systems Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (WPAFB), Ohio; Electronic Systems
Center, Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts; and Air Armament Center, Eglin Air
Force Base, Florida. Approval was obtained through the WPAFB Civilian Personnel
Office to include civilian union members at the three PCs in the survey pool. This survey
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was endorsed and distributed through HQ AFMC/XPM (Plans and Programs Directorate,
Manpower and Organization Division). The survey attempted to measure the perceived
success of each of General Martin’s four objectives, job satisfaction and organizational
commitment and general opinions of the reorganization overall. Once the data was
collected, it was analyzed using the predictive analysis software program Statistical
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) Version 13.0. Analysis included reliability
measurements on each of the objectives, the general reorganization questions, job
satisfaction, organizational commitment, and a combination of all four objectives and the
general reorganization questions. Frequencies were calculated on all questions to
determine the mean scores per question and per objective overall.
Limitations
The survey was administered to current employees of AFMC PCs only. It did not
collect information from any other members of AFMC or previous members of AFMC
who are now assigned to other commands. The draft survey was administered to a pilot
group of ten respondents for review/comment, and then finalized for the identified
respondent group.
Preview
Chapter II provides the literature review information utilized for this study.
Chapter III includes development of the investigative questions, the data collection
method chosen and proposed data analysis. Chapter IV includes an analysis of the
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respondent data collected and discussion of these results. Chapter V contains the
conclusions made from this study and recommendations for further research.
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II. Literature Review

This chapter begins with an overview of change management, organizational
culture, organizational culture reform movements, and organizational theory (job
satisfaction and organizational commitment). The chapter then describes more detailed
aspects of the 2003 PEO Realignment, a historical overview chart of AFMC, and aspects
of the 2004 AFMC Reorganization (including transfer of installation commander
responsibility, the PCs and ALCs). Lastly, the chapter concludes with a detailed look at
the Product Center portion of the reorganization.

Change Management
Effective management of change entails asking some key questions (Chapman,
2005): What do we want to achieve with this change, why, and how will we know that
the change has been achieved? Who is affected by this change, and how will they react
to it? It is the responsibility of management to manage change. Managers should
facilitate and enable change from an objective position. This helps people to understand
the reasons for change and ways to respond positively according to their own situations
and capabilities. Managers should interpret and communicate versus instruct and
impose. Someone in management is often the “change agent” who gets the process going
(McNamara, 1999). This is a challenging role, especially as successes as well as
problems arise.
If you force change on people, normally there are more problems.
Management can be the settling influence to help people understand and
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manage the change. Involving and informing people creates opportunities
for participation in the planning and implementation of change. Creating
a sense of ownership among those most affected can be very beneficial
(Chapman, 2005).
Normally, senior managers and directors do not fear change; they may even thrive
on it. It is the people below them they need to be concerned about. Change is often seen
as threatening and fearsome. When change is forced, people often feel they must be
doing something “wrong” that caused the need for change (Chapman, 2005). If people
are not approaching their jobs effectively, the organization is to blame not the people
themselves. Strong resistance to change is often rooted in deeply conditioned or
historically reinforced feelings. A lot of patience is required in these situations to help
people begin to see things differently. Recognizing that different personality types react
differently is also important. Traits like reliability and dependability are opposite
characteristics to mobility and adaptability.
Traditionally, e-mail and written documentation are weak tools to convey and
develop understanding for the change occurring (Chapman, 2005). Face-to-face contact
is always the best approach. Surveys are a good way to repair any damage or lack of
trust as a result of change, but only if (1) they are anonymous and (2) management
publishes and acts on the survey results.
There are several traditional change management principles. The first is
to at all times involve and seek support from people within the
organization. Secondly, understand where the organization is at the time.
Then, understand where the organization wants to be and how it will get
there. Next, organizations should plan development towards reaching the
goal identified in measurable stages. Lastly, communicative, enabling
involvement from the people should be pursued as early and freely as
possible (Chapman, 2005).

8

Kotter (1995 and 2002) advocates eight steps to successful change. In each step,
he identifies a key principle relating to people’s response and approach to change.
1. Increase Urgency – inspire people to move, make objectives real and relevant.
2. Build the Guiding Team – get the right people in place with the right emotional
commitment and the right mix of skills and levels.
3. Get the Vision Right – get the team tot establish a simple vision and strategy,
focus on emotional and creative aspects necessary to drive service and efficiency.
4. Communicate for Buy-In – involve as many people as possible, communicate the
essentials, simply, and appeal to and respond to people’s needs. E-clutter
communications – make technology work for you rather than against.
5. Empower Action – remove obstacles, enable constructive feedback and lots of
support from leaders – reward and recognize progress and achievements.
6. Create Short-Term Wins – set aims that are easy to achieve – in bite-sized chunks,
manageable numbers, of initiatives and finish current stages before starting new
ones.
7. Don’t Let Up – foster and encourage determination and persistence – ongoing
change – encourage ongoing process reporting – highlight achieved and future
milestones.
8. Make Change Stick – reinforce the value of successful change via recruitment,
promotion, new change leaders and weave change into culture.

Change management is but one of many aspects of managing people and their
environment which falls under the context of organizational culture.
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Organizational Culture
One of the most widely accepted definitions of organizational culture is: a pattern
of basic assumptions, invented discovered or developed by a given group as it learns to
cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked
well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, is to be taught to new members as the
correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems (Schein, 1990).
So what effect does organizational culture have on implementing change?
Similar attempts at change may succeed in one organization yet fail in another.
Understanding the organizational culture is a prerequisite to implementing
transformational change and development (Manley, 1998). Change that happens to an
organization is very different from change that is planned by the organization’s members
(Cummings and Huse, 1989). There are different ways of looking at change. One
example would be through leadership styles. Some leaders take the approach of bold
strategic moves while others change through diligent, continuous improvements.
Another way to look at the change is based on the magnitude of the change itself. The
magnitude of change in an organization can vary tremendously case-by-case. One such
aspect of change management within an organization is when the change affects the
organization’s entire culture and creates reform.

Organizational Culture Reform Movements
In the business sector, organizational culture reform movements have two key
features: (1) their origins in the realization that U.S. companies had lost their
competitiveness in the last three decades of the twentieth century and (2) their
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commitment to increasing organizational effectiveness, competitiveness, flexibility, and
responsiveness by changing organizational cultures (Shafritz and Ott, 2001). Increased
competition in global markets has forced the U.S. industry to take a new look at the way
they do business. Reform movements seek to increase productivity, flexibility,
responsiveness and customer service by reshaping organizational cultures. One example
of a reform movement initiative that General Martin has referenced specifically is
Business Process Reengineering (BPR).
BPR is defined as “the fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of business
processes to achieve dramatic improvements in critical, contemporary measures of
performance, such as, cost, quality, service and speed” (Hammer and Champy, 1993).
BPR gets down to the fundamental level of processes by asking things like “why are we
here?” and “what is our process now?” before initiating any change. Once processes are
identified, the change is typically radical and dramatic, going to the root of the problem
and making orders of magnitude in changes. As BPR is applied to a process, the BPR
team is always looking at the impact on the customer. Although BPR has not been
applied specifically to AFMC processes yet, General Martin had tasked organizations to
identify low yielding tasks for reengineering (Martin, 2004d). This organizational
culture reform movement has an associated domino effect on the organizations
employees, especially with their job satisfaction.
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Organizational Theory – Job Satisfaction
Job satisfaction and organizational commitment are two work attitudes that are
often looked at in organizational culture (Williams, no date). Many factors in the
workplace can contribute to these attitudes, especially reorganization. Theorists within
this area of specialization include Frederick Hertzberg, Abraham Maslow, and A.B.
Mumford.
Job satisfaction is defined as “the extent to which people like (satisfaction) or
dislike (dissatisfaction) their jobs“ (Spector, 1997). There are different dimensions of
satisfaction that can include factors such as co-workers, pay, job conditions, supervision,
nature of the work and benefits. Research has shown that satisfied employees tend to be
more productive, creative and committed to their employers (Syptak, 1999). It is even
theorized that creating a positive workplace for employees can actually increase the job
satisfaction of management as well (Spector, 1997).
There are many different theories on job satisfaction. Hertzberg’s theory includes
two dimensions to job satisfaction: motivation and hygiene (Gawel, 1997). Hygiene
issues would include environment related factors like company policies, supervision,
salary, interpersonal relationships and working conditions. Motivators can create
satisfaction by fulfilling individual needs for meaning and personal growth. These are
issues like achievement, recognition, the work itself, responsibility and advancement.
Hertzberg states that once the hygiene areas are addressed the motivators will promote
job satisfaction and encourage production (Chapman, 2005).
Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs has been adopted as an explanation for motivation
in the workplace (Gawel, 1997). This theory concludes that as needs are met on each
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level; the person is then motivated by the need at the next level. As needs are satisfied at
each level, employees subsequently will want more from their employers. The five levels
are: (1) physiological needs such as hunger and thirst, (2) security needs such as shelter
and protection, (3) social needs such as the need for satisfactory and supportive
relationships, (4) higher order needs like self-esteem, the need for recognition and belief
in oneself and (5) self-actualization which is defined as realizing one’s full potential
(Gawel, 1997). Although many people never reach the top level, it is essentially an end
goal point for which we may not even realize we are striving.
Mumford assumed employees do not just see their job as a means to an end but
have needs, which relate to the nature of their work. He stated that workers have (1)
knowledge needs for work that utilizes their knowledge and skills; (2) psychological
needs such as recognition, responsibility, status and advancement; (3) task needs, which
include the need for meaningful work and some degree of autonomy; and (4) moral needs
to be treated in the way that employers would themselves wish to be treated (“Motivation
and Job Satisfaction”, no date).
Employee’s satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with their job parlays into another
subfield of organizational commitment.
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Organizational Theory - Organizational Commitment
Organizational commitment is defined as “a psychological state that (a)
characterizes the employee’s relationships with the organization and (b) has implications
for the decision to continue membership in the organization” (Meyer and Allen, 1994).
There are three focus areas for organizational commitment: affective, continuous and
normative (Meyer and Allen, 1994). Affective refers to the employee’s perceptions of
their emotional attachment or identification with their organization. Continuance refers
to perceptions of the costs associated with leaving the organization. Normative refers to
an employee’s perception of obligation to their organization.
It is also important to look at what builds an employee’s organizational
commitment. There are four main areas that work together: competency, comfort,
leadership and communication (NEHRA, 2002). Competency relates to understanding
their role in the organization, seeing how they add value, being challenged by their work
and having clarity about their goals. Comfort relates to feeling part of a community,
believing their organization is viable, experiencing a sense of team, feeling they are
treated equally and fairly and engaging in dialogue with management. Leadership should
understand the employee’s vision for leadership and personal growth, create a sense of
stability, be empathetic and stay in tune with issues. Communication with employees
ensures they receive valuable information frequently, helps employees see managers as
trustworthy and candid and should allow employees regular face-to-face meetings with
management.
Organizational commitment in a military organization is not consistent with
civilian organizations in some areas. There are distinct differences between fulfilling a
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wartime mission and completing a typical task in the business world. The military has a
congressionally controlled budget and other guiding documentation such as the Federal
Acquisition Regulation that must be followed at all times. The chain-of-command and
military customs and courtesies are rooted in military tradition. This is not the same
environment you would experience in a civilian organizational hierarchy.
Using this literature review as a foundation, the research now narrows down to
these areas as applied within a military setting. Some specific military issues addressed
for this research were 1) the PEO realignment, 2) AFMC History, 3) the 2004 AFMC
Reorganization and 4) the PC reorganization portion.

Program Executive Officer Realignment
PEO responsibility encompasses a variety of functions. The PEO for a particular
system, or family of systems, may handle procurement, development, implementation,
deployment, maintenance, and even operations. Their overarching mission is program
oversight of their assigned system(s). A PEO in the civilian community is often referred
to as the executive officer. In civilian companies, this person occupies a similar role for
whatever service or product in which that particular company specializes. PEOs are used
in all branches of the military; but for this research, the focus was on the acquisition
community due to its specific impact on AFMC.
Just before General Martin’s arrival in AFMC in August 2003, the AF decided to
realign PEO responsibilities. The Secretary of the AF and Chief of Staff of the AF
signed a memorandum called the “PEO Restructure” (Martin, 2005). This memorandum
reorganized the acquisition structure so both the management and execution of programs
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for major weapon systems reside with the commander of one of the three PCs. The
individual accountable for program performance and the individual responsible for
supplying the resources to get the job done are now the same. The PEO would no longer
work directly for the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (SAF/AQ) in Washington,
D.C.; instead, each of the AFMC Product Center commanders would become the new
PEO (Martin, 2004h). This realignment included Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC) at
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; Electronic Systems Center (ESC) at Hanscom
Air Force Base, Massachusetts; and Air Armament Center (AAC) at Eglin Air Force
Base, Florida. Previously, these three product centers were organized separately and
connected indirectly to the acquisition chain of command. The Product Center (PC)
commanders each assumed new roles working directly for SAF/AQ; the ASC
Commander is the PEO for Aircraft; the ESC Commander is the PEO for Command and
Control (C2); and the AAC Commander is the PEO for Weapons and Munitions (Martin,
2004h). As Center commanders, they also work directly for the AFMC commander.
Each center vice commander and executive director was redesignated as a deputy, one for
acquisition and one for support (“Agile Acquisition” 2004).
In addition to the three PEO positions working directly for SAF/AQ, two of the
AF’s major weapon systems have an individual PEO: the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and
the F/A-22 Raptor. The F-35 PEO will rotate annually between the Navy and the Air
Force (“U.S. Air Force Agile Acquisition” 2004).
When General Martin arrived in AFMC, he felt tension between AFMC and
SAF/AQ over who was responsible for acquisition programs (Martin, 2004c).
Conflicting guidance led AFMC and SAF/AQ to each believe they were responsible,
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when in reality AFMC organizes and staffs the system program offices for acquisition
support and the PEO directs the program offices under SAF/AQ guidance.
General Martin stated that while attending program management reviews
with SAF/AQ, he observed there was not one responsible person who
answered to the Under Secretary for Acquisition-related issues and to the
AFMC/CC for train-organize-equip issues. As of 2003, there’s no longer
finger pointing between PEO and center commanders because they are
now one and the same. It makes for improved efficiency and
accountability. (Martin, 2005)
Now, the center commander’s primary responsibility is as a PEO. To assist with
their responsibilities as center commanders, PEOs have two assigned deputies. Both
deputies are at the General Officer/Senior Executive Service (SES) level, one is the focal
point for acquisition and the other for support. In the future, the plan is to transfer PEO
ownership for weapon systems in the sustainment phase to the ALC commanders. This
will eliminate the old title center commanders held of Designated Acquisition
Commander when they managed non-PEO programs (“Secretary of the” 2003). The
federally mandated PEO realignment further solidified General Martin’s belief that
AFMC needed significant organizational change to meet the recent responsibilities
assigned to a PEO. This federally mandated realignment is one of the differences
between the military and private sector organizations with respect to organizational
culture reform. It is mandated by Congress, not by profit or competitive edge. Now, it is
helpful to review the background of AFMC and the “what and why” General Martin
believed AFMC “organizational change” was necessary.

Historical Look at AFMC
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The history and evolution of AFMC was looked at in detail to gain an
understanding of how we arrived where we are today. Although AFMC itself was
created in 1992, there are many years of prior history to be considered in this command.
The complete review is available in Appendix 1 of this research.
In order to touch on the key occurrences, Table 1 provides an overview of this
information. This brief chronological timeline eludes to some of the added burdens a
military organization must contend with to stay “on top”: congressional oversight, federal
acquisition regulations, budget cycles, 40-60 year life cycles of weapon systems, research
and development efforts; just to name a few. All of these concerns and events over the
past sixty plus years within the AF acquisition community provide the backdrop which,
combined with the 2003 PEO realignment, perhaps influenced General Martin’s decision
to reorganize AFMC.
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Table 1: Overview of the Evolution of AFMC
(Carlin; 1992, 2001)
Time Period
1900s- 1940s

1950s

1960s

1970s
1980s

1990s to
present

Key Aspects
Basic functions of material support were completely separate.
Creation of Air Materiel Command (AMC) and Air Research and
Development Command (ARDC)
Program Management Responsibility Transfer (PMRT)
The Anderson Committee
Creation of the System Program Office (SPO)
AF acquired space mission
AMC became Air Force Systems Command (AFSC)
ARDC became Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC)
PMRT still a concern
Packard Commission
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act
National Security Review (NSR) 11
McDonald-Loh Study
Merger of AFSC and AFLC was proposed
Defense Management Report Decisions
AFSC and AFLC Integration Plan created
AFMC was created (1992)
Integrated Weapon System (ISXM) was developed and had many
challenges and obstacles
Depot Maintenance Review Team (DMRT)
Homeland Defense and Combat Support Sector established in AFMC

2004 AFMC Reorganization
The AFMC reorganization initiated in 2004 consisted of three major change
areas. First was HQ AFMC, then the transfer of installation commander responsibilities
from the center commanders to the Air Base Wings (ABW), and finally the
standardization of the PCs and ALCs. The previous AFMC structure had lasted for
decades before our most recently departed AFMC commander, General Gregory S.
Martin, recognized the need for organizational change. The HQ AFMC portion and the
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transfer of installation commander responsibilities have been completed. The PC and
ALC reorganization is still ongoing and is expected to be completed sometime in 2006.
General Martin took over as AFMC Commander on 22 August 2003. At this
time, AFMC looked nothing like the rest of the Air Force structurally. The title of “SPO”
and “home office” was alien to the other operational commands. SPOs were considered
“nonunits” under Air Force Instruction 38-101, Air Force Organization.
AFMC was the only Major Command (MAJCOM) not organized into the wing,
group and squadron structure. AFMC had always mirrored the business world, even
though it is clearly a military organization. It was believed by senior leaders in AFMC
(and others) that most people in other MAJCOMs did not understand the composition or
the mission of AFMC specifically for this reason. The 2004 restructuring was designed
to make AFMC more recognizable to the rest of Air Force by grouping like elements.
General Martin outlined four objectives that the reorganization was supposed to
meet. The first objective was to strengthen support to operational commands and
warfighters in the field. Second, AFMC must continue supporting and maturing the PEO
realignment. Third, there is a need to structure AFMC similar to the way all other Air
Force major commands operate. Fourth, AFMC must structure the command with a
capability-based versus platform-based focus (Martin, 2004h).
The plan from the beginning (March 2004) was to conduct 6, 12 and 18-month
reviews of each area to identify seams or gaps between new functional areas (Martin
2004a). A 6-month review was conducted within Headquarters AFMC in May 2005.
This review consisted of an automated survey and personal interviews with certain
directors and division chiefs. Automated survey inputs came from the director and
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his/her key staff only, not the subordinates within the headquarters. No measurement of
General Martin’s four key objectives have occurred prior to this thesis.

Headquarters AFMC (2004)
The reorganization of HQ AFMC focused on the mission, resources and support
functions. The headquarters mission is to “shape the workforce and infrastructure to
develop, field, and sustain war-winning expeditionary capabilities.” The HQ mission
statement read too much like the AFMC mission statement (Martin, 2004c). AFMC
needed a distinction between the role of a MAJCOM HQ and the centers. A directorateby-directorate scrub of non-MAJCOM work was accomplished to ensure HQ is only
doing the tasks appropriate for a MAJCOM HQ (Martin, 2004e).
The AFMC command management structure includes the AFMC Council who
receive oversight and secretariat duties from the Plans and Programs Directorate and the
Commander’s Action Group. The AFMC Council approved the HQ AFMC
reorganization in January 2004 (Martin, 2004a). General Martin briefed AFMC’s desire
to reorganize to the Chief of Staff of the AF (CSAF) and Secretary of the Air Force
(SECAF) before he approved the Organizational Change Request (OCR), which was then
submitted to Air Staff for approval (Martin, 2004b). After Air Staff approval, in April
2004, changes to offices that did not require union bargaining occurred first (Martin,
2004f). Next, union bargaining occurred and all union requirements were met before
June 04. Now the AFMC reorganization process could begin.
First, a review of manpower authorizations required in each area occurred for the
Capabilities Integration Directorate (XR), the Operations Directorate (DO), the
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Engineering Directorate (EN), the Logistics and Sustainment Directorate (LG), the
Transformation Directorate (TR) and Mission Support Directorate (MS) because these
directorates were the most significantly affected by the reorganization. There were new
mission statements, new task lists, new responsibilities and skill set mismatches to be
considered, resolved and explained.
The headquarters reorganization moved Requirements (DR), Science and
Technology (ST), Acquisition Center of Excellence (AE), Intelligence (IN) and EN’s
modeling and simulation into the new XR. XR is responsible for AFMC’s development
mission and is the focal point for science and technology. The goal is to have a single
office responsible for integrating science and technology, intelligence, modeling and
simulation and incorporating them into the capabilities produced by the AFMC
acquisition process (Martin, 2005). Technical orders and sustainment engineering was
moved from EN to LG in order to consolidate all logistics and sustainment functions.
Creation of a new Fielding Division in DO was accomplished to reenergize weapon
system fielding. TR and IT were combined into the new TR to focus on leveraging
information technology and process improvement. Day-to-day network operations
moved from IT to MS. Responsibility for workforce management in DP was centralized.
The Director of Staff’s role expanded to include directing everyday activities of the
MAJCOM headquarters staff. These changes created new organizations to fulfill areas
that AFMC was neglecting like capability planning, acquisition logistics and fielding
(Martin, 2004c). Headquarters directorates were tasked to re-engineer and map the
processes for areas where transformation could occur.

22

Three tenets guided General Martin so the HQ will better meet customer
expectations. They are 1) the goal, 2) the means and 3) the attitude. The goal represents
the focus of delivering war-winning capabilities on time and on cost. The means
represent reorganizing to provide what customers need, divest of low value tasks and
reengineer to become more efficient. The attitude represents being professional enough
to make the changes. Directors were charged with transforming their organizations by
fundamentally changing what they do to better support the AF of the future.
Another change was implemented on 1 October 2005. HQ AFMC has decided to
mirror joint forces nomenclature for their organizations (Ely, 2005). If an employee is
working at a joint job and wants to contact someone in personnel, the office symbol is not
DP. It is the number one preceded by the letter J for joint. AFMC plans to incorporate
this same naming system. As of Oct 05: A (for Air) then 2 is Intelligence (IN), A3 is
Operations (DO), A4 is Logistics and Sustainment, A5 is Plans and Programs (XP), A6 is
Communications and Information (new), A7 is Installation and Mission Support MS), A8
is Financial Management (FM), and A9 is Capabilities Integration and Transformation
(XR). Even since Oct 05 designators continue to change. For example, A5 has now
changed to A8. It will take some time to get used to the new nomenclature but the end
goal of following what other services already do will be met. The goal of this change is
to improve communication flow and reduce spin-up times as our people transition from
one headquarters assignment to another (Ely, 2005). The biggest challenge will be that
not all of AFMC’s work fits easily into the A-staff designations. A few areas will remain
the same.
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This change in headquarters organizations, and subsequently nomenclature as
well, was supported by the decision to transfer installation commander responsibility.

Transfer of Installation CC Responsibility
After the headquarters reorganization, the next significant change occurred in
March 2004 with the movement of installation commander responsibility from the PC
and ALC commanders to the ABW. Since the PC commanders now also occupy the role
of PEO, it was more important they keep their focus on acquisition, logistics, or test and
evaluation than the everyday activities of running an installation (Martin, 2004j). This
change also gave “colonel level” responsibilities back to colonels. The ABW
commanders will now gain more of the valuable experience needed to progress to the
senior officer level. Traditional support duties and responsibilities, and some jobs,
transitioned to the ABW but no jobs were eliminated overall. The personnel change
gives ABW commanders direct authority over the people and processes they require and
makes AFMC look more like the rest of the AF MAJCOMs (Martin, 2004g). (This
change did not affect the Commander at Arnold Engineering Development Center,
Tennessee, who will remain installation commander or the Aerospace Maintenance and
Regeneration Center, which is a tenant on Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona,
where Air Combat Command (ACC) already fills the installation commander role.)
The next required step to implement AFMC organizational change was the
standardization of the PCs and ALCs, and the main purpose of this thesis research.

Product Centers and Air Logistics Centers

24

Overview
The reorganization of the PCs and ALCs, to become standardized, changed
structures that had existed for decades, even before AFMC itself was created. These
changes were outlined in OCR packages with the Product Center changes occurring first.
Planning was substantially complete in Fiscal Year (FY) 2004 but the implementation did
not occur until FY 2005. Some of the OCR packages (as of March 2006) are still
outstanding and hopefully will be completed sometime later this year (2006). At the
center staff level, the PC/ALC reorganization took some 79 different (and often
redundant) office symbols and created only 20 authorized office symbols. This would
standardize the center staff functions at each of the centers.

Challenges
There were three major challenges to overcome with this portion of the AFMC
reorganization: standardization, decentralization of personnel and unit nomenclature
(Ferguson, 2005). The biggest challenge was the standardization of PC and ALC staffs
into groups, squadrons and wings. Directorates can now be System Sustainment Wings,
Groups or Squadrons based on size, funding, and mission. This new structure was
designed to clarify lines of authority, establish command responsibility (like Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) authority), define ownership of manpower and budget
resources, reduce reliance on matrixed support and, of course, make the PCs and ALCs
look like the rest of the operational AF (Ferguson, 2005). It was hoped by the AFMC
senior leaders that through these changes, no longer will people struggle at each AFMC
installation to find a particular functional area.
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AFMC has been decentralized for most of its existence. The key unit in the
Product Centers prior to the reorganization was the SPO. Personnel working in the SPOs
were assigned to functional directorates. The directorates matrixed personnel based upon
the needs of the individual SPOs at any given point in time. In the instance of matrixed
personnel the term “home office” was used to designate the organization they were
actually assigned to. This term was only used in AFMC.
For example, the previous horizontal structure of the Engineering Directorate
(EN) providing matrixed engineers wherever needed is gone. The new vertical structure
permanently assigns engineers to manpower-coded positions. This means when an
engineer completed a project under the old structure, EN could move him/her wherever
he/she was needed most. Under the new structure, the engineer remains in the same
position even if there isn’t a new project waiting for him/her to start. Another
organization may be in need of additional engineering support but cannot task that
potentially underutilized engineer. Adjusting to this loss of flexibility has been, and will
likely continue to be, a challenge.
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Drawbacks to the System Program Office Concept
As programs progressed through the acquisition cycle from the earliest phases of
concept development to the procurement and delivery of completed systems to the Air
Force, the number of personnel and the mix of skills required could be expected to
change substantially (Ferguson, 2005). Other factors like Foreign Military Sales would
require more personnel assigned. Most SPOs were responsible for a single system.
Basket SPOs were responsible for a group of systems or subsystems that had similar
missions or purposes. For example, at ASC the Reconnaissance SPO and the Special
Operations Systems Forces SPO were basket SPOs. ASC alone had over 15 unique
SPOs. This means no two SPOs were the same size or organized the same internally and
crated several drawbacks to the SPO, which are highlighted next. (Please note unit
nomenclature will be discussed at the end of this section, as it is still an open OCR at the
time of this research).
The Air Force and senior leaders saw many drawbacks with the SPO concept.
Two concerns are the lack of operational AF alignment and promotion opportunity
(Ferguson, 2005). The primary concern was the lack of standard group/wing/squadron
structure like the rest of the Air Force. Since AFMC looked different, it was harder for
other MAJCOMs to understand. General Martin made it a central point that AFMC
should strive to look like the rest of the AF as much as possible. This lack of
standardized structure also affected AFMC’s manpower. There was no clear standard for
manpower required to handle the systems acquisition mission. Proposals to incorporate
wings or groups were first suggested in the 1990s but were rejected at higher levels
(Carlin, 1992).
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Another opinion raised by senior leaders was that the SPO placed its officers at a
disadvantage for promotion. Since most officer promotion boards consist of officers
from operational commands, their understanding of AFMCs unique structure was often
limited. The duties and responsibilities of a unit commander were standardized while the
duties of a SPO director were not. Other personnel in the SPO were even more limited
by their unique titles. This may have made it less likely for promotion boards to
recognize the performance and accomplishments of personnel assigned to AFMC SPOs
(Ferguson, 2005).
All of these previously discussed issues with the PCs and ALCs, as well as the
drawbacks with the SPO concept, forced the need for a new center concept.

Developing the New Center Concept
In FY 2004, AFMC was tasked to develop a new structure that would apply to all
the product centers (Carlin, 2001). This also fell in line with the PEO realignment of the
Center Commander and PEO now being the same person. Previous jurisdictional barriers
to establishing wings/groups/squadrons had been lifted.
The commander of ASC, the largest of the PCs, worked with the AFMC
Transformation Directorate to develop this new concept. In November 2003, the then
ASC Commander, Lieutenant General Richard Reynolds, met with the CSAF, the
Secretary of the AF and the Assistant Secretary of the AF for Acquisition to expand on
the details. For the next several months, an Integrated Product Team (IPT) led by
AFMC/XP accomplished this tasking. General Martin briefed this new concept at
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CORONA SOUTH (a general officer level meeting) on 11 February 2004 and received
endorsement by the CSAF.
On 4 March 2004, Colonel Daniel Badger of AFMC/XPM briefed the concept to
the AFMC Center Commanders (Carlin, 2001). This gave the center commanders the
opportunity to address the organizational templates as a group. They looked at the
Center staffs, the PCs and the ALCs. It was decided the wings/groups/squadrons at the
PCs would all use the word “Systems” in their new titles and the ALCs would all use the
word “Materiel” in their new titles. Despite the lack of resolution on a few issues, the
new concept was incorporated into the OCR for submittal to the AF for approval by 30
April 2004. The issues raised included finalizing a structural template for each center,
nomenclature for wings/groups/squadrons, the roles and responsibilities of the Center
functional staffs and civilians leading AF units.
The unit structures for each of the PCs were completed after a month of planning
and data collection. When this information was briefed to General Martin, detailed
criteria were outlined in explanation of the structure. The size, echelon and desired
leadership rank would be based on the number of manpower authorizations (including
contracted personnel), matrixed personnel, dollars managed and Acquisition Category
(ACAT) of the programs managed (Carlin, 2001). After Col Badger presented this
portion, Colonel Andrew Weaver, then Special Assistant to the Commander, presented a
briefing on study results regarding the resizing of headquarters based on ratios found in
industry of supervisors-to-workers. General Martin questioned several areas: the
nomenclature for the units, the proposals for structure of the Center-level staff
organizations and the way in which the proposed unit structure had been developed. He
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did not feel they were transformational and possessed too much of the old way of looking
at things. He redirected the IPT to apply the concepts from Col Weaver’s briefing to the
PC structure. Some of the proposed groups and wings could possibly be combined into
larger wings and also become less platform specific; the idea was to organize around
capabilities regardless of platform.
The AFMC Council met again on 7 April 2004 and presented a revised proposal
to the AFMC Vice Commander. This meeting clarified that the IPT was moving in the
right direction to implement General Martin’s previous comments. The proposed ASC
structure did not change significantly but the AAC and ESC structures did. Unit names
were now less system specific and the number of reporting units was reduced. (These
new names were also meant to be more recognizable outside of AFMC.) Although
budget was clearly still a factor in the chosen echelon, this method was still in question.
Gen Reynolds raised the question of what budget figures should be used: the future year,
the current year or total program cost? Another concern raised was that very large wings
may require General Officer or Senior Executive Service leadership, which would
adversely affect the position of the Center commander and the number of promotable
Colonel positions. It was concluded that consistent budget numbers should be used to
establish standards and that a peer review process should be used to finalize the
individual center proposals.
The AFMC Council met one last time on 15 April 2004 to present the revised
proposal to General Martin. The organizational structure for the three Product Centers
was approved to go forward to a General Officer Reconciliation Board to perform the
peer review; this would ensure consistency across the centers. General Martin also
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indicated the peer review would look closely at the criteria for determining echelon. The
timeline for Initial Operating Capability (IOC) for the new structure was set for
implementation by 1 October 2004. Also under discussion were the standardized
templates for Center staffs and civilian led AF units.
The General Officer Reconciliation Board was chaired by Gen Reynolds. The
board proposed changes to the echelon that were incorporated into the proposal. The
changes were briefed and approved at the AFMC Spring Commander’s Conference on 11
May 2004. The three PCs submitted their OCR to AFMC/XP for finalization. The end
result was the requested creation of ≈66 new units. These units consisted of: ≈11 wings,
≈31 groups and ≈24 squadrons. The remaining challenge with the centers is naming the
new units.

Nomenclature of the New Center Units
The main outstanding issue under consideration now was the nomenclature of
these new units. There was extensive processing behind the scenes to determine if the
units should bear names or numbers. If they used numbers, the issue of new versus
historical also had to be considered. Initially, named units was the approach, with the
idea of numbered units to be considered later in the process. This still left the debate
over wording of the names. Rather than specific names like Air Interceptor Missile
Wing, General Martin asked for broader, less-specific titles like “Air Superiority Wing”
or “Counter Air System Wing.” This concept was then applied to all the proposed
names. The idea of using historical numbered units was still on the table as well; over
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the course of several weeks this idea was explored but not implemented. Concerns were
raised over using numerical designators for completely different missions than what they
had originally been created for. A template was created with all new numerical
designators for the proposed units. The numbers came from a group of unused numbers
in the 500-series. The theory behind this approach was that numerical designators would
clearly distinguish which organizations fell into each chain of command while names
only would not. It would also shorten some of the lengthy proposed names on the table.
This proposal was sent to General Martin for approval in early July 2004 and approved
by him later in the month. While AFMC continued to explore the idea of historical
numerical designators, leaders at Air Staff expressed their disapproval of numeric
designators completely. In order to expedite the process, General Martin decided to go
back to named units for the time being. The final OCR package for the PCs requested
named units but the ALC package still request numbered units. The OCR package(s) that
address the office symbols for centers are still outstanding at this time.

Summary
In the future, the new units should enable AFMC to build standard sized units and
resources to field a weapon system or follow aircraft through depot maintenance (Martin,
2004k). The rest of the MAJCOMs have already been doing this for years. There is a
specific requirement for a fighter squadron as far as aircraft, resources and personnel.
This has never been the case in AFMC. As new programs develop, there is no system in
place to get the personnel and resources needed. Often within AFMC, we must “take”
people from other organizations and hire contractors to fill the gaps. With the
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establishment of resource earning units, the basis for decisions about manpower needs
will follow. Numbers of personnel will vary depending on the stage in the program life
cycle. This will essentially reduce waste of personnel and resources in the acquisition
community.
The 2004 AFMC reorganization was prompted by a federally mandated change
(PEO Realignment) which created culture reform within AFMC. General Martin chose
to be proactive about “fixing” known inefficiencies within AFMC (historical
background) during his tenure as AFMC/CC by his 2004 AFMC Reorganization
initiative. The research now attempts to measure this success by looking General
Martin’s four objectives the reorganization was supposed to meet: job satisfaction,
organizational commitment, and general overall opinions through a web-based survey.
This methodology is discussed in the next chapter.
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III. Methodology

The purpose of this chapter is to explain the methodology used in this research
effort. Development of the investigative questions is addressed first. Then, the rationale
for the use of a survey as the data collection method is explained. Lastly, the chapter
outlines the data analysis procedures. It was hypothesized that the reorganization was
successful in meeting each of the four objectives and that AFMC employees are satisfied
in their jobs and committed to their organizations.

Development of the Investigative Questions
The investigative questions were based on General Martin’s four objectives for
the 2004 AFMC Reorganization effort. The objectives were used as a basis for
measurement of success of the reorganization. Each objective has investigative questions
designed specifically to measure the success of that particular objective. Each area
consisted of a set of survey questions that attempt to answer the investigative questions
presented. There are a total of eight investigative questions, listed below with their
corresponding objective or organizational theory aspect.
Objective 1: Strengthen support to operational commands and warfighters in the field.
1) Has the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization succeeded in strengthening
support to operational commands?
2) Has the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization succeeded in strengthening
support to warfighters in the field?
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Objective 2: Continue supporting and maturing the PEO realignment.
3) Has the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization supported the PEO
realignment?
4) Has the PEO realignment matured as a result of the 2004 AFMC Product Center
reorganization?
Objective 3: The need to structure AFMC similar to the way all other Air Force major
commands operate.
5) Has the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization successfully restructured
AFMC similar to the way all other Air Force major commands operate?
Objective 4: A capability-based versus platform-based focus.
6) Has the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization created a capability-based
versus platform-based focus?
The following investigative questions are based on the organizational theory aspects
of this research:
7) As a result of the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization, are AFMC Product
Center employees satisfied with their jobs?
8) As a result of the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization, are AFMC Product
Center employees more or less committed to their organizations?

Additionally, this study identified areas related to the reorganization that may
need additional attention through open-ended questions at the end of the survey
instrument.
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Data Collection Method
The data collection method chosen for this research was a web-based survey of all
personnel currently assigned to the three AFMC PCs. This survey was sponsored by HQ
AFMC/A8M, who distributed the survey electronically to the three PCs. This method of
data collection used random sampling where every sample unit has an equal chance of
selection. The PC commanders were tasked to disseminate the survey to all personnel
assigned to their respective PC; Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright-Patterson AFB,
Ohio; Electronic Systems Center, Hanscom AFB, Massachusetts; or Air Armament
Center, Eglin AFB, Florida. Participation in the survey was completely voluntary and the
anonymity of all respondents was maintained.
The rationale for use of a survey was related to obtaining information directly
from the people most affected by the 2004 reorganization. Senior management played a
huge part in the implementation but may not be aware of the impact on the other levels of
personnel within the bureaucratic hierarchy affected. A survey provides an anonymous
outlet for PC personnel to voice their opinions about the reorganization without any fear
of reprisal. The goal was to reach personnel in all levels of the PCs through this webbased survey. Web-based surveys are effective tools because the survey itself can be
completed from any location that has internet access. Web-based surveys are also less
costly and time consuming than surveys distributed through the mail.
Use of a survey instrument for an AFIT thesis entails following a detailed
approval process. Before release to the public, the requirements included: human
subjects training, development of the survey instrument, thesis committee approval of the
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survey instrument, Air Force Research Lab (AFRL) approval of the survey instrument
and Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC) approval of the survey instrument.
The CITI (Collaborative Institutional Review Board Training Initiative) Course in
the Protection of Human Research Subjects Training was completed in accordance with
this process (see Appendix X). The survey was then designed with inputs from thesis
committee members and additional personnel assigned to HQ AFMC/A8M. Once
approval was obtained from these parties, the survey was pilot tested among several
fellow AFIT student members. Recommendations and comments from all parties were
taken into account when finalizing the instrument. Once finalized, the survey was
submitted for exemption from human experimentation requirements approval to AFRL,
Wright Site Institutional Review Board. This approval was obtained on November 3,
2005 (see Appendix X). The next step in the process required approval from AFPC, Air
Force Survey Program. This approval was obtained on December 14, 2005 (see
Appendix X). Once the approval process was complete, the survey was sent to HQ
AFMC/A8M, for dissemination among the three PCs. Mr. James Engle, HQ AFMC/A5
sent the survey link and corresponding e-mail request out on December 21, 2005. The
survey was available for responses through January 13, 2006. Once all responses were
collected the data analysis process began.

Data Analysis
A survey is an effective tool for quantitative research because it focuses on
measurable variables. By creating groups of targeted questions for each of the four
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objectives, their success is a measurable item for final analysis. The choice of multiple
item measures was made since the use of single item measures for psychological
constructs is typically discouraged because they are presumed to have unacceptably low
reliability (Wanous and Reichers, 1997).
Within the survey instrument, specific sets of questions were designed to answer
each of the investigative questions. Survey questions 1-6 measured Objective 1. Survey
questions 7-16 measured Objective 2. Survey questions 17-26 measured Objective 3.
Survey questions 27-32 measured Objective 4. Survey questions 33-39 gathered a
general overview opinion of the success of the reorganization. Survey questions 40-52
measured job satisfaction. Survey questions 53-58 measured organizational commitment.
Survey questions 59-71 collected demographic information on the respondents. Survey
questions 72-74 provided a forum for open-ended answers regarding the reorganization.
The responses to questions 72-74 are included in Appendices G, H and I, respectively.
HQ AFMC/A8M verbally indicated these responses will be included as input to SAF/AQ
as to the efficiency and effectiveness of the reorganization to date.
Data cleaning was performed to identify any errors and/or potential conflicts with
the data entries. Each survey response was automatically assigned a survey identification
number. Questions within the survey maintained the same numbering assigned on the
survey instrument itself (Appendix B). Frequencies were calculated for all questions to
determine if any answers were out of the 1 to 7 Liker scale range. The following errors
were identified, and corrective actions taken, using SPSS and a visual check of the data:


Removed the following survey responses because the respondents failed to
answer any of the questions: identification numbers 20, 29, 40 and 95. This was
visually evident in the data by the input of “999” showing up in every field.

38



Removed the following survey because the respondents failed to answer 29 of the
questions: identification number 146. This was visually evident in the data by the
occurrence of “999” 29 times.



Survey questions that were skipped within survey id numbers that were primarily
answered in whole were given a neutral value of 4:
o Survey identification number 9 – Question 103
o Survey identification number 10 – Question 103
o Survey identification number 18 – Question 112
o Survey identification number 22 – Question 118
o Survey identification number 28 – Questions 28, 143
o Survey identification number 30 – Questions 73, 122
o Survey identification number 34 – Question 30
o Survey identification number 35 – Question 11
o Survey identification number 36 – Question 7
o Survey identification number 37 – Question 21
o Survey identification number 43 – Question 134
o Survey identification number 44 – Question 143
o Survey identification number 45 – Question 92
o Survey identification number 47 – Question 92
o Survey identification number 50 – Question 79
o Survey identification number 52 – Question 122
o Survey identification number 55 – Question 121
o Survey identification number 58 – Question 104

For ease of analysis, it is often helpful to recode some responses into single digit
values instead of the actual response value chosen. Data integrity is not affected in any
way when this is done.


Recoded the responses to question 59, age: a value of 1 represents 19 or younger,
a value of 2 represents 20-29, a value of 3 represents 30-39, a value of 4
represents 40-49, a value of 5 represents 50-59, a value of 6 represents 60 or older
and a value of 9 represents a missing answer.



Recoded the responses to question 60, gender: a value of 1 represents male and a
value of 2 represents female.



Recoded the responses to question 61, marital status: a value of 1 represents
single, a value of 2 represents married, a value of 3 represents divorced and a
value of 4 represents widowed.
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Recoded the responses to question 62, civilian or military: a value of 1 represents
Department of Defense (DoD) civilian, a value of 2 represents retired military
member now working as a civilian, a value of 3 represents retired military
member now working as a contractor, a value of 4 represents active duty officer
(not prior enlisted), a value of 5 represents active duty officer (prior enlisted), a
value of 6 represents active duty enlisted and a value of 7 represents contractor.



Recoded the responses to questions 66-70 to consolidate the wide variety of
responses into variables of 1 through 7. Each of these questions had a response of
various years and months of duty: a value of 1 represents 0-5 years, a value of 2
represents 6-10 years, a value of 3 represents 11-15 years, a value of 4 represents
16-20 years, a value of 5 represents 21-25 years, a value of 6 represents 26-30
years, a value of 7 represents 31-35 years and a value of 8 represents 36 or more
years.



Recoded the responses to question 71, current AFMC Product Center duty
location: a value of 1 represents Wright-Patterson, a value of 2 represents
Hanscom and a value of 3 represents Eglin. This immediately identified the lack
of responses from one PC, Hanscom.
Questions that are negatively worded are looking for a response at the opposite

end of the Likert scale than questions that are positively worded. This is often a good
indicator if the respondent is thoroughly reading each question or just marking along one
side of the survey only. In order to accurately assess responses to negatively worded
questions, the answers must be reversed (1 becomes 7, 2 becomes 6, etc.) to vary in the
same direction as the positively worded questions.


Reverse coded the following survey questions identified as falling into this
category: 10, 28, 49, 54, 57 and 58.

Once the data was cleaned, it was analyzed using the predictive analysis software
program SPSS. SPSS eliminates the use of manual calculations by providing both simple
and complex types of data analysis techniques. These can range from simple tests to
validate reliability and general trends in data to analyzing complex relationships through
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techniques like linear regression and then providing detailed quantitative results. SPSS
can also create output tables and diagrams upon request. For this research effort, the
analysis conducted included reliability measurements on each of the objectives, the
general reorganization questions, job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and a
combination of all four objectives and the general reorganization questions. Reliability
measures each included all of the survey questions in that section. For example, the
reliability of Objective 1 was calculated using survey questions 1 through 6. The
reliability of the combination of all the objectives and the general reorganization
questions was calculated using questions 1 through 39. Frequencies were calculated on
all questions to determine the mean scores per question and per objective overall. Mean
scores on survey questions represent the average of all responses for that particular
question. The mean is a good measure of central tendency in normal distributions
(Litwin, 1995). Since this survey instrument had set parameters for responses (1 through
7), the responses did not contain extreme scores. The measurement of reliability in a
survey instrument determines whether the instrument accurately met its intended
objective and if the results can be duplicated.
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Reliability and Validity
Reliability is a statistical measure of how reproducible the survey instrument’s
data are (Litwin, 1995). Reliability is freedom from measurement or random error.
When repeated measurements of the same thing give identical or very similar results, the
measurement instrument is said to be reliable. In survey research, there are typically two
types of error, random error and measurement error (Litwin, 1995). Random error is the
unpredictable error that occurs in all research. One way it can be reduced is by a larger
sample size. Measurement error refers to how well or how poorly a particular instrument
performs in a given population (Litwin, 1995). Statistics are used to calculate the
probability that a particular result is due to random error. Once the type of error is
assessed and a measure is deemed reliable, the data results can be duplicated with a
satisfactory degree of accuracy. In this research effort, there was one overarching
hypothesis (that the 2004 reorganization made a positive difference) and eight
investigative questions. In quantitative research, the hypothesis is either supported or not
supported by the data. The null hypothesis states that there is no difference among the
groups being measured. If the data does not support the hypothesis, then the null
hypothesis is supported. If the data does support the hypothesis, then the null hypothesis
is rejected.
Besides determining a survey item’s or scale’s reliability, the researcher must
assess its validity, or how well it measures what it sets out to measure (Litwin, 1995).
Just because the item in question is a good measure of reliability does not guarantee
validity. Content validity was determined by the thesis committee members prior to
entering the survey approval process. It was determined that the survey’s contents
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included an appropriate set of items. Content validity is not statistical in nature but
represents the overall opinion of a group, in this case the thesis committee members.
Criterion validity between survey instruments was not measurable because this was the
first survey to look at the PC reorganization results. Concurrent validity judges the
survey instrument against some other standard for measurement that is already accepted.
In this instance, the job satisfaction and organizational commitment sections were not
taken from an already accepted standard for measurement. To prove construct validity,
replication is necessary to show that similar answers would be obtained in both
occurrences.
Once the analysis procedures were completed, the results were gathered for
review in relation to the investigative questions being answered.
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IV.

Results and Analysis

The purpose of this chapter is to present the results of the data analysis procedures
utilized in relation to the investigative questions being answered.
The sample size that this survey was intended to reach was approximately 5,250
personnel. This total is based on the combined authorized positions at each of the three
product centers. (ASC at Wright-Patterson has approximately 2,450 personnel; ESC at
Hanscom has approximately 1,950 personnel; and AAC at Eglin has approximately 850
personnel.) The total responses received were 164 with 5 responses being removed in the
data cleaning process leaving 159 survey responses for analysis. Unfortunately, survey
responses were only received from two of the three PC locations. (No responses were
received from ASC at Wright-Patterson.) Since the survey was disseminated via
electronic mail, it is impossible to determine where the distribution stalled. This shortfall
prevents analysis among responses between the three different PCs.
The dependent variable is the one being caused or affected and the independent
variable is the one causing or affecting the other. The reorganization represents the
independent variable with each of the measured areas representing dependent variables.
Whether a variable is dependent or independent varies based on the measure being used.
If a relationship between the two variables is statistically significant, it indicates the
variables are related to one another. Significance is related to the importance of a
relationship between two variables (Alreck and Settle, 2004).
For General Martin’s four objectives, the general reorganization questions, job
satisfaction, and organizational commitment measures, the same Likert scale of 1 through
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7 was used. Survey responses of 1-Strongly disagree; 2-Disagree and 3-Slightly
Disagree were judged as indicating a negative opinion of the reorganizations impact.
Survey responses of 5-Slightly agree; 6-Agree and 7-Strongly agree were judged as
indicating a positive opinion of the reorganizations impact. A survey response of 4 was
considered “Neutral” indicating the reorganization had little or no impact.
Each objective and general question will now be discussed individually and
include a summary statistics table with the mean, median, and mode of all responses.
These statistics directly support the conclusions reached. Within the tables, “Q1”
represents question number one on the survey instrument, “Q2” represents question
number two on the survey instrument, etc. The term “ObjectiveX” used in the correlation
table represents a grouped analysis of the survey questions that answered Objective X.
Some of the tables appear slightly compressed due to page width constraints.

Objective 1
Regarding Objective 1 (strengthen support to operational commands and
warfighters in the field), the results indicate a negative opinion of the reorganization’s
impact. The mean scores for all six questions were within the 3.08-3.66 range, indicating
the average response was slightly disagree or neutral (Table 2). For both investigative
questions 1 and 2, if the reorganization had an effect in strengthening support to
operational commands and warfighters in the field, the hypothesis would have been
supported. In this case, the reorganization does not appear to have made a difference in
these areas, so the null hypothesis is supported.
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The internal consistency for Objective 1 is .959 based on a commonly used
measure of reliability, Cronbach’s Alpha. If a Cronbach’s Alpha score is higher than .70
the measure is said to be reliable (Litwin, 1995). Therefore, the measurement of
Objective 1 was reliable.
Table 2: Statistics for Objective 1
Statistics
N

Valid
Missing

Mean
Median
Mode
Sum

Q1
159
0
3.64
4.00
4
578

Q2
159
0
3.66
4.00
4
582

Q3
159
0
3.11
3.00
4
495

Q4
159
0
3.08
3.00
4
489

Q5
159
0
3.31
4.00
4
526

Q6
159
0
3.35
3.00
4
532

Objective 2
Regarding Objective 2 (continue supporting and maturing the PEO realignment in
the field), the results indicate the reorganization had little or no impact in this area. The
mean scores for all ten questions were within the 3.56-4.55 range, indicating the average
response was neutral (Table 3). For both investigative questions 3 and 4, if the
reorganization had an effect continuing support for and maturing the PEO realignment,
the hypothesis would have been supported. In this case, the reorganization does not
appear to have made a difference in these areas, so the null hypothesis is supported.
The internal consistency for Objective 2 is .816; therefore, the measurement of
Objective 2 was reliable.
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Table 3: Statistics for Objective 2
Statistics
N

Valid
Missing

Mean
Median
Mode
Sum

Q7
159
0
4.21
4.00
6
669

Q8
159
0
4.02
4.00
4
639

Q9
159
0
3.72
4.00
4
592

Q10
159
0
4.04
4.00
4
643

Q11
159
0
4.01
4.00
6
638

Q12
159
0
4.23
5.00
6
672

Q13
159
0
4.14
4.00
4
658

Q14
159
0
4.55
4.00
4
723

Q15
159
0
4.02
4.00
4
639

Objective 3
Regarding Objective 3 (the need to structure AFMC similar to the way all other
Air Force major commands operate), the results indicate the reorganization had little or
no impact in this area. The mean scores for all ten questions were within the 3.04-4.65
range, indicating the average response was neutral (Table 4). On four of the survey
questions in this section, the mode was either 5-Slightly agree or 6-Agree indicating a
slightly more positive response for this section. For investigative question 5, if the
reorganization successfully restructured AFMC similar to the way all other Air Force
major commands operate, the hypothesis would have been supported. In this case, the
reorganization does not appear to have made a difference in this area, so the null
hypothesis is supported.
The internal consistency for Objective 3 is .897; therefore, the measurement of
Objective 3 was reliable.
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Q16
159
0
3.56
4.00
4
566

Table 4: Statistics for Objective 3
Statistics
N

Valid
Missing

Mean
Median
Mode
Sum

Q17
159
0
4.04
4.00
5
642

Q18
159
0
4.01
4.00
6
637

Q19
159
0
3.19
3.00
4
508

Q20
159
0
4.28
5.00
6
680

Q21
159
0
3.44
4.00
4
547

Q22
159
0
4.65
5.00
6
739

Q23
159
0
3.09
3.00
4
491

Q24
159
0
3.09
3.00
4
491

Q25
159
0
3.04
3.00
4
484

Q26
159
0
3.47
4.00
4
551

Objective 4
Regarding Objective 4 (create a capability-based versus platform-based focus),
the results indicate the reorganization had little or no impact in this area. The mean
scores for all six questions were within the 3.48-4.04 range, indicating the average
response was neutral (Table 5). For investigative question 6, if the reorganization had an
effect creating a capability-based versus platform-based focus, the hypothesis would have
been supported. In this case, the reorganization does not appear to have made a
difference in this area, so the null hypothesis is supported.
The internal consistency for Objective 4 is .838; therefore, the measurement of
Objective 4 was reliable.
Table 5: Statistics for Objective 4
Statistics
N
Mean
Median
Mode
Sum

Valid
Missing

Q27
159
0
3.84
4.00
4
610

Q28
159
0
3.48
4.00
4
553

Q29
159
0
4.04
4.00
4
643
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Q30
159
0
3.54
4.00
4
563

Q31
159
0
3.53
4.00
4
562

Q32
159
0
3.77
4.00
4
600

General Questions
Regarding the “General Questions” section pertaining to the reorganization as a
whole, the results indicate the reorganization had little or no impact. The mean scores for
all seven questions were all in the 3.02-4.12 range, indicating the average response was
neutral (Table 6). This indicates the reorganization as a whole does not appear to have
made a difference. Increased effectiveness, efficiency and improved morale responses
were primarily neutral. Adaptation to reorganization changes, being well-informed about
reorganization goals and being well-informed about actual changes that would occur
were also primarily neutral.
The internal consistency for the General Questions is .865; therefore, the
measurement of the General Questions was reliable.
Table 6: Statistics for General Questions
Statistics
N

Valid
Missing

Mean
Median
Mode
Sum

Q33
159
0
3.50
4.00
4
556

Q34
159
0
3.02
3.00
4
480

Q35
159
0
3.25
3.00
4
516

Q36
159
0
3.15
3.00
4
501

Q37
159
0
4.08
4.00
5
648

Q38
159
0
4.12
4.00
5
655

Q39
159
0
4.02
4.00
5
639

Four Objectives and General Questions Combined
Regarding the Four Objectives and the General Questions combined, the results
indicate the reorganization had little or no impact. The mean scores for all the questions
were within the 3.02-4.65 range, indicating the average response was neutral. There was
no investigative question targeted for this measurement.

49

The internal consistency for the Four Objectives and the General Questions
combined is .959; therefore, this measurement was reliable.

Job Satisfaction and Organizational Commitment
The next two sections, job satisfaction and organizational commitment, did not
specifically request responses be given in relation to the reorganization. (This was noted
as a shortcoming of the survey itself upon data analysis.) Subsequently, the job
satisfaction and organizational commitment measures are actually a snapshot in time of
AFMC PC employee job satisfaction and organizational commitment when this survey
was administered. Job satisfaction and organizational commitment are not directly tied
to the measurement of success of the reorganization and therefore cannot effectively
answer the investigative questions, which, in turn, does not support the hypothesis.
Regarding job satisfaction, the results indicate job satisfaction is at a satisfactory
level. The mean scores for twelve of the thirteen questions were within the 4.33-5.55
range (Table 7). The mode for the same twelve questions was 6-Strongly Agree
indicating a generally positive response to job satisfaction related questions. One
question, number 49 (reverse coded), had a significantly lower mean of 2.81. (Question
49 was, “I often have to bend a rule or policy to get things done.”) This may indicate a
separate problem within the AFMC PC community. For investigative question 7, if
AFMC Product Center employees are satisfied with their jobs as a result of the
reorganization, the hypothesis cannot be answered with this measurement tool.
The internal consistency for Job Satisfaction is .851; therefore, the measurement
of Job Satisfaction was reliable.
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Table 7: Statistics for Job Satisfaction
Statistics
Q40
Valid 159
Missin
0
Mean
5.04
Median
6.00
Mode
6
Sum
802
N

Q41
159
0
4.92
6.00
6
783

Q42
159
0
4.33
5.00
6
689

Q43
159
0
5.45
6.00
6
867

Q44
159
0
5.49
6.00
6
873

Q45
159
0
4.35
5.00
6
691

Q46
159
0
5.53
6.00
6
879

Q47
159
0
4.96
5.00
6
789

Q48
159
0
5.55
6.00
6
883

Q49
159
0
2.81
2.00
2
446

Q50
159
0
5.54
6.00
6
881

Q51
159
0
5.33
6.00
6
848

Q52
159
0
5.20
6.00
6
827

Regarding organizational commitment, the hypothesis was intended to measure
whether AFMC PC employees are more or less committed to their organization as a
result of the reorganization. The mean scores for four of the six questions were within
the 4.25-5.20 range (Table 8). Two questions, number 54 (reverse coded) and 57
(reverse coded), had significantly lower means of 2.55 and 2.23 respectively. (Question
54 was, “If another organization offered me a promotion or pay raise I would leave.”
Question 57 was, “I don’t feel a sense of pride or accomplishment as a result of the work
I do.”) This may indicate other problems within the AFMC PC community. For
investigative question 8, if AFMC Product Center employees are more or less committed
to the organization, the hypothesis that they are more committed as a result of the
reorganization cannot be answered with this measurement tool.
The internal consistency for Organizational Commitment is .290; therefore, the
measurement of Organizational Commitment was not reliable.
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Table 8: Statistics for Organizational Commitment
Statistics
N

Valid
Missing

Mean
Median
Mode
Sum

Q53
159
0
5.20
6.00
6
827

Q54
159
0
2.55
2.00
1
406

Q55
159
0
4.89
5.00
6
778

Q56
159
0
5.11
5.00
6
812

Q57
159
0
2.23
2.00
2
354

Q58
159
0
4.25
4.00
4
676

Correlations
Correlations represent the extent to which two or more things are related to one
another. The correlation coefficient shows the degree to which the variables are related.
The correlation range is from -1 to +1 with zero representing no correlation. The Pearson
Product Moment Correlation (Pearson r) shows the degree of linear relationship between
two variables that have been measured on interval or ratio scales (Litwin, 1995).
In this research, all measures of the reorganization itself are statistically
significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test). The correlations between the four
objectives and the general questions are all positive indicating that each of these
measures vary together in the same direction (Table 9). This positive correlation is
appropriate because the stronger any respondent may have felt about the reorganization
in one area, the stronger the same respondent would most likely be in other areas as well.
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Table 9: Correlations
Correlations
ObjectiveOne ObjectiveTwo
ObjectiveOne Pearson Correlation
1
.622**
Sig. (2-tailed)
.000
N
159
159
ObjectiveTwo Pearson Correlation
.622**
1
Sig. (2-tailed)
.000
N
159
159
ObjectiveThree Pearson Correlation
.673**
.569**
Sig. (2-tailed)
.000
.000
N
159
159
ObjectiveFour Pearson Correlation
.570**
.618**
Sig. (2-tailed)
.000
.000
N
159
159
General
Pearson Correlation
.699**
.670**
Sig. (2-tailed)
.000
.000
N
159
159

Objective
Three
ObjectiveFour General
.673**
.570**
.699**
.000
.000
.000
159
159
159
.569**
.618**
.670**
.000
.000
.000
159
159
159
1
.628**
.775**
.000
.000
159
159
159
.628**
1
.641**
.000
.000
159
159
159
.775**
.641**
1
.000
.000
159
159
159

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Demographics
The demographics of respondents were not a consideration in measuring the
success of the reorganization. This data was gathered primarily for comparisons between
the three PCs, which is not possible because one of the PCs provided no responses to the
web-based survey. ESC at Hanscom provided 38.4% of the responses, AAC at Eglin
provided 59.1% of the responses, and ASC at Wright-Patterson provided 0.0% of the
responses (2.5% of respondents did not answer this question).
Overall, respondents were primarily between 40-59 years of age, married, male,
DoD civilians, and possess a graduate degree. Rank and AFSC varied greatly and
showed no significant trends. Time in current position was primarily 0-5 years.
Respondents spent a variety of years assigned in AFMC but primarily less than 0-5 years
assigned outside of AFMC. Overall, the most common total time working for the Air
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Force (both military and civilian) was 16-25 years. This data is broken down in Tables
10 through 18.

19 or younger
0%

20-29
7.5%

Single
11.9%

DoD
Civilian

50.3%

GED/High
School
.6%

Table 10: Age Dispersion
30-39
40-49
17.6%
30.2%

50-59
33.3%

60 or older
9.4%

Table 11: Marital Status Dispersion
Married
Divorced
Widowed
76.1%
6.9%
5%

Table 12: Civilian or Military Dispersion
Retired
Retired
Active
Active
Active
Military
Military
Officer
Officer Enlisted
now
now
(not
(prior)
Civilian Contractor
prior)
10.1%
9.4%
16.4%
5.7%
3.1%
Table 13: Level of Education Dispersion
Some
Associates Bachelors Graduate
College
Degree
Degree
Degree
6.3%
2.5%
24.5%
55.3%

Contractor

Doctorat
e
6.9%

5%

Other
3.7%

0-5
Years
55.3%

6-10
Years
5.7%

Table 14: Time in Current Position Dispersion
11-15
16-20
21-25
26-30
31-35
Years
Years
Years Years Years
2.5%
6.9%
1.3%
4.4%
.6%

36 or
More
1.2%

No
Answer
22.6%

0-5
Years
25.2%

6-10
Years
11.9%

Table 15: Years Assigned in AFMC Dispersion
11-15
16-20
21-25
26-30
31-35
Years
Years
Years Years Years
10.1%
21.4%
13.2%
3.8%
2.5%

36 or
More
3.1%

No
Answer
11.9%

0-5
Years
44%

Table 16: Years in Other Air Force Commands Dispersion
6-10
11-15
16-20
21-25
26-30
31-35 36 or
Years
Years
Years
Years Years Years More
14.5%
11.9%
10.1%
1.3%
1.8%
.6%
0%

No
Answer
15.7%
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Table 17: Years Assigned to Secretariat or Headquarters USAF Dispersion
0-5
6-10
11-15
16-20
21-25
26-30
31-35 36 or
No
Years
Years
Years
Years
Years Years Years More Answer
65.4%
.6%
1.3%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
32.7%
Table 18: Total Time Working for The Air Force (military and civilian duty) Dispersion
0-5
6-10
11-15
16-20
21-25
26-30
31-35 36 or
No
Years
Years
Years
Years
Years Years Years More Answer
8.2%
8.2%
8.2%
19.5%
20.1%
8.8%
10.7% 6.3% 10.1%
Open-ended Questions
The survey data also included responses to open-ended questions number 72 –74;
however, the focus was not on analyzing this data. The complete set of responses to
these questions was a total of 209. For these three questions only, all 164 survey
respondent responses were included. For question 72, 44% chose to answer and 56% did
not provide any response (72 out of 164). For question 73, 52% chose to answer and
48% did not provide any response (85 out of 164). For question 74, 32% chose to answer
and 68% did not provide any response (52 out of 164). In some answers, responses were
edited to protect the anonymity of respondents.

Summary
Overall, measurement of the 2004 reorganization success indicated lack of a
strong impact in any of the four objective or general areas measured. The measurements
of job satisfaction and organizational commitment in relation to the reorganization were
not valid. However, 209 comments indicate many other areas of concern within the
AFMV PCs. Despite the lack of any significant statistical trends, conclusions can be
drawn from this research that will be helpful for further analysis of this area in the future.
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V. Discussion
The purpose of this chapter is to draw conclusions regarding the 2004 AFMC PC
Reorganization. This research also generated recommendations for future research. As
with all research, limitations were also identified.

Conclusions
This research indicates that the 2004 AFMC PC Reorganization did not have a
significant impact in the areas identified by General Martin’s four objectives or in a
general overview of the reorganization.
Job satisfaction and organizational commitment results were not valid based on
the manner in which questions were presented. In not specifically instructing
respondents to answer these sections based on the reorganization, the data collected was
unable to answer the hypotheses. The job satisfaction section itself was a reliable
measure but did not statistically measure in relation to the reorganization. This could
certainly be duplicated with the emphasis placed on the reorganization in future studies.
The organizational commitment section was not a reliable measure so it most likely could
not be duplicated in the same form.
There could be many causes for the lack of significant impact of the
reorganization. The primary cause may be that since the reorganization is still ongoing
(and less than 15 months old), the desired effects may not be evident yet. There may also
be the impact of General Martin’s retirement in August 2005. Since he was the change

56

agent, he was intimately familiar with all aspects of the reorganization process and status.
His successor has many areas to become familiar with in a short time and the
reorganization is just one. In contrast to the measured areas of the survey, although most
respondents did not feel the reorganization had a significant impact, their responses to
questions 72-74 indicate many areas of concern. It is these areas of concern that will be
of value in future assessments of the reorganization.

Recommendations
During the course of this research there were five areas identified for future
research opportunities: other surveys, civilian leadership, impact of a new AFMC/CC,
acquisition metrics and organizational culture. They will be highlighted below.
First, since the reorganization is still ongoing there are five opportunities in the
future where a survey could be a valuable tool for measurement:
•

Fine-tuning this survey to be able to statistically measure ALL responses.

•

A survey of all AFMC personnel when the reorganization is officially
complete

•

A follow-up survey for the PCs after the reorganization is complete

•

A survey of the Air Logistic Centers

•

A survey of AFMC customers (all-inclusive)

Second, a new area of concern as a result of the reorganization is the impact of
civilian leadership within a base level military unit. It would be valuable to evaluate the
effectiveness of operational civilian leadership as compared to operational military

57

leadership. The introduction of civilian leadership in military units has raised
considerable controversy due to various reasons such as, potential changes in promotion
rates as a result of the reorganization. This could be measured through a study of
promotion rates among previously assigned (old duty titles) or current (new duty titles)
AFMC personnel.
Third, there is the consideration that now General Martin has retired and AFMC
is under a new commander. It will be interesting to observe the future process of the
reorganization since its primary change agent, General Martin, is no longer in command.
It is also often thought that every leader wants to leave a distinct legacy and perhaps this
reorganization was General Martin’s. Looking into the impact of dynamic leadership
changes made in an organization would be an excellent topic for another thesis.
Fourth, the development of metrics for the acquisition community would be
another excellent way to measure success in AFMC. This has been attempted in various
ways throughout history and one consistent measure, AFMC wide, would prove to be
very valuable to measure effectiveness and efficiency. Currently, there is really no
measure of success for acquisition programs in place. A good startup point would be to
matrix the open-ended comments received (Appendices G, H and I) to determine the
“priority” perceived by the respondents.
Lastly, the reorganization certainly had considerable organizational culture
impacts on AFMC. Awareness of these types of changes and their affects on AFMC
employees would be useful. Another assessment of job satisfaction and organizational
commitment in relation to the reorganization could be completed individually or in
conjunction with any of the other areas identified above.
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The research, of course, had its own limitations that must be taken into
consideration.

Limitations
There were four limitations identified in the completion of this research: the
survey instrument, privacy act considerations, respondents were internal to AFMC and
time constraints.
First, the use of survey in itself creates limitations. The respondents who chose to
take the survey may have preconceived opinions about surveys that affected their
responses. Respondents may also feel it necessary to respond in a particular manner
based on their placement in the organization. Any number of unknown factors could
have impacted the responses on the particular date and time a respondent chose to
complete the survey. The data collected also represents only one point in time and was
only collected via the survey instrument. Since the anonymity of respondents was
completely preserved, this may have impacted the decision whether or not to complete
the survey as well as the responses selected.
Second, in order to preserve the anonymity of respondents, assigned organizations
were not obtained. The data could only be broken down into the PC assigned. It might
be useful to have specific duty assignment positions with which to identify problem areas
in the organizations. Currently, it is not possible to determine if there are significant
problems in any one duty section.
Third, the survey was also only administered to current AFMC employees. This
target audience could inadvertently left out valuable responses from personnel outside
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AFMC. Responses from customers of AFMC were also not gathered. The
reorganization impact on customers of AFMC may have been more significant than on
AFMC employees.
Lastly, the survey was only available for response for a limited time period due to
the constraints of the AFIT thesis timeline. It is possible a larger response could have
been obtained if the survey was available for a longer period of time. The dissemination
process used was not as effective as hoped. The first e-mail message sent out was sent to
the PCs and the ALCs. This caused some confusion as the survey was only intended for
the PCs. A follow up e-mail was sent out to clarify this point but there is no way to
accurately assess how well the survey was disseminated. It may have been better for it to
be sent out in a different manner.
In summary, great potential for future research was identified as well as building
blocks for AFMC to further assess the success of reorganization objectives. The survey
instrument developed, data collected, and conclusions reached in this research effort
serve as a valuable contribution to the planned follow-up reorganization assessments HQ
AFMC/A8M will be administering in the near future.
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Appendix A: Historical Look at AFMC
Historical Look at AFMC
Military leaders have been trying to figure out the best way to do things for as
long as we can remember. Reorganizations, realignments, restructuring, and whatever
the “buzz” word of the time seems to occur almost continuously. A great example of this
attempt is the evolution of AFMC. It is the unique and diverse missions within AFMC
that have so challenged military leaders for years and continue to do so today.
AFMC was established on 1 July 1992 with the combination of Air Force
Logistics Command (AFLC) and Air Force Systems Command (AFSC). AFLC and
AFSC were not just merged together but integrated through their overlapping roles. The
overarching goal of the merger was to manage weapon systems throughout their entire
life cycle. One overarching command would now be responsible for “cradle-to-grave”
management including research and development, acquisition and sustainment. The
establishment of AFMC was based on “certain reoccurring issues…all stemmed from the
common problem of finding an effective way to manage a weapon system throughout its
life cycle” (Carlin, 1992). Unfortunately, the answer to this question changed frequently
over the years depending on the leadership of the time. To understand the theory behind
the creation of AFMC, it is helpful to look at AFMC from its earliest beginnings.

1900’s – 1940’s
When the Army Signal Corps controlled military aviation in 1917, the three basic
functions of materiel support, research and development (R&D), supply and maintenance
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and procurement and production were completely separate (Carlin, 1992). In the Army
Air Corps years, R&D was mostly left to private industry and the Material Division
unified the three remaining functions.
For most of World War II the Materiel Command (MC) handled procurement and
the Air Service Command (ASC) handled logistics. Problems occurred when the MC
and the ASC overlapped in functions. Senior leaders recognized the need for change and
in 1944 combined the two commands into the Air Technical Service Command, which a
year later was renamed the Air Materiel Command (AMC). The changing role of R&D
throughout this process was best addressed by General Henry H. Arnold. He believed
that science and technology was the key to an effective Air Force in the future (Carlin,
1992). This led to the decision to separate R&D from procurement and the subsequent
establishment of the Air Research and Development Command (ARDC) in 1950.

1950’s
The problem now was figuring out when each command would assume
responsibility for a weapons system; there was no distinct dividing line between the
commands. Offices became known as Joint Program Offices (JPO) and the two
commands worked in conjunction on weapon systems. Division of funding and
engineering and the issue of Program Management Responsibility Transfer (PMRT) were
ongoing concerns. PMRT was designed to occur between the two commands when a
weapon system moved into the sustainment phase. It was difficult to determine in the
“cradle-to-grave” life of a weapon system, at what point would PMRT be shifted from
one command to another. Often when a system shifted, too much knowledge and

62

background was essentially “left behind” in the old command despite the supposed JPO
structure. In an effort to solve the responsibility problems between the commands,
another organizational change occurred. The informal JPO structure was restructured to
the Weapon System Program Office (WSPO) and was now tightly structured under
several AF regulations. Still, the concern of whether R&D should be separate from
acquisition lingered.
In 1959, General Curtis LeMay formed a study group, headed by General Samuel
Anderson, to address the management of weapon support systems throughout their life
cycle. This huge undertaking, known as the Anderson Committee, came up with several
ideas to determine a concept of efficient weapon system management and any
organizational changes needed to make the concept a reality. One leader of the time,
General Mark Bradley, Jr., proposed minor realignment of functions versus
reorganization. General Bradley felt this would improve the present way of doing
business yet not make any fundamental changes. It was General Anderson who believed
that fundamental change was necessary to fix what was broken and truly integrate
development, procurement and production. General Bernard Schriever proposed one
large acquisition command that was responsible for R&D and procurement and a separate
command for logistic support. It was General Schriever’s belief that engineers and
logisticians were not meant to be in competition with one another but actually represent
the present and future of the service. In all, the Anderson Committee came up with four
proposed courses of action and the Chief of Staff, General Thomas White, made the final
selection. In 1960, the final report outlining the decision most closely resembled General
Bradley’s proposal. Although General Anderson’s proposal to reunite ARDC and AMC
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was not adopted at this time, it ended up happening some 31 years later with the creation
of AFMC.
This led to the creation of a new series of AFRs starting with 375-1 that governed
weapon system management. More importantly, it created the organization that remained
in place in AFMC for over 40 years, the System Program Office (SPO). With the demise
of the WSPO the SPO was lauded to be able to, “carry on concurrently a wide range of
diverse yet highly integrated acquisition activities” (Carlin, 1992). This was the
overarching goal of everyone involved.

1960’s
Another major change occurred in the Air Force in 1961 when the Secretary of
Defense, Robert McNamara, assigned the space mission to the Air Force. With the
incorporation of this new mission, AMC and ARDC were renamed AFSC and AFLC.
AFSC would handle R&D, procurement and production while AFLC would handle
supply, maintenance, transportation, and procurement of spare parts and miscellaneous
items. This change was very similar to both General Schriever’s un-adopted proposal
during the Anderson Committee years and to the original format of ASC and MC sharing
responsibility. It may have seemed unsure to some people whether we moved forward or
took a step back in time with this change.
Although the creation of AFSC and AFLC created organizational stability, the
concern over PMRT had to be addressed again. The AFLC commander at the time
thought PMRT was a bad idea and that one manager should be responsible for both the
development and modification/sustainment of a weapon system; too much knowledge

64

was lost when PMRT occurred. It also threw the budget into limbo for sometimes as
long as two years because AFSC and AFLC were funded from different pots of money.

1970’s
In the early 1970’s, another study group was formed to look at the AFSC/AFLC
processes and recommend improvements. Despite the research performed, no significant
changes occurred and the organizational problems continued. In early 1978, with new
AFSC and AFLC commanders in place, the problem of PMRT was again identified for
improvements. The primary focus was to expedite the transfer of weapon system
programs; over 60 programs were identified for transfer from AFSC to AFLC in the
following three years. This was good start but more problems followed with the transfer
of the TR-1 and the KC-10 aircrafts. The problems were so severe; another study group
was formed to assess the program responsibility assignments of these weapon systems.
This review group suggested a new format of single management of the entire program
by one office. It was even suggested that perhaps this new format could apply to other
weapon system programs in the future. AFSC thought this was a great idea but AFLC
did not agree. AFLC suggested the systems selected were not good examples for this
new template. AFSC showed otherwise with a good case example of the time, the B-52.
Although the B-52 program had transferred to AFLC in 1965, AFSC was still providing
continuous technical assistance that the program could not have been managed without.

1980’s
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The latter part of the 1980s brought increased attention to the acquisition
community. President Reagan’s arms buildup led to many reports of contractors severely
overcharging the government and acquisition personnel letting it happen. Countless
Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition studies flowed at the same time with little or
no change until the Packard Commission.
The most important occurrence in acquisition during this time was the 1986
President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, more commonly known
as the “Packard Commission” after its chairman Deputy Secretary of Defense David
Packard (Carlin, 1992). The reports from the Packard Commission set the tone for all
future acquisition reports that followed. The primary problem identified by the Packard
Commission was the lack of effective organization in the acquisition community; no
DoD person, in charge of acquisition, existed to regulate the different branches of
service.
The goal of the Packard Commission’s findings was to, “establish unambiguous
authority for overall acquisition policy, clear accountability for acquisition execution,
and plain lines of command for those with program management responsibilities”
(Carlin, 1992). The position of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition was
established to oversee DoD acquisition. Each branch of the military would then appoint
a Service Acquisition Executive as a subordinate. The Service Acquisition Executives
would then appoint a PEO to manage a chosen group of weapon system programs. The
direction for future acquisition reform efforts had been established.
In the same year, Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act. This act was designed to consolidate acquisition functions primarily
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by strengthening civilian control over acquisition and reducing levels of bureaucracy in
the Pentagon. This would reduce the duplication at the secretariat level and the Chief of
Staff level. The new consolidated group was placed under the Assistant Secretary for
Acquisition and was responsible for over 400 programs. The AF appointed eleven PEOs,
mostly commanders of current acquisition organizations.
The next major step in acquisition reform occurred in 1989 with President George
Bush’s National Security Review (NSR) 11. This instructed DoD to “develop a plan to
accomplish full implementation of the recommendations of the Packard Commission and
to realize substantial improvements…in defense management overall” (Cheney, 1989).
The original structure was already in place and now Program Managers (PMs) were
directed to report to their respective PEO on cost, schedule and performance of their
respective programs. This change removed some of the responsibility from the service
logistical commands and the systems acquisition commands. Secretary of Defense Dick
Cheney provided further instructions by recommending establishment of specially trained
acquisition officers, and further consolidation and streamlining of existing acquisition
and logistical organizations. Secretary Cheney stated that these changes would save the
DoD approximately $30 billion by FY 93. Secretary Cheney and Deputy Secretary of
Defense Donald Atwood held a press conference to share this information. It was during
this conference that the first mention of merging AFSC and AFLC was presented. No
answer was provided at that time because the Air Force would have to conduct a review
to consider the possibility.
In the early summer of 1989, the McDonald-Loh study was instituted to study
(not recommend for or against) the question of merging AFSC and AFLC into the
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unnamed command of AFXX. The study was co-chaired by Lieutenant General Charles
McDonald and Lieutenant General John Loh. The study identified three major categories
that the functions of the two commands could be divided into; more of the functions were
unique to each command than common between both commands. Some of the unique
AFSC functions were initial system development, major system acquisition, management
of the AF science and technology program, operation of AF test facilities and operation
of the space launch system. Some of the unique AFLC functions were modifications,
reliability and maintainability upgrades, the operation of a wholesale and retail supply
system, and commodity acquisition. Common functions were resource allocation,
planning and programming, contracting, the comptroller, program management and
engineering.
The McDonald-Loh study also came up with two models of operations that could
be implemented. The first was to simply have AFXX as oversight for the contracting
activity, allocation of work and resources, management of professional development and
training, management of the infrastructure and oversight of the logistics operations.
PEOs and product division commanders would be one and the same. This clearly did not
follow the new plan for acquisition reform. The second model, called NSR 11, would
keep PEOs separate from product division commanders. The PEOs would manage all
major acquisition programs with their own staff. The headquarters of AFXX would
provide administrative support and direct logistics operations. The commanders of
product divisions and ALCs would manage the “non-major” programs, support PEOs and
PMs, and conduct logistics operations. This model complied with acquisition reform and
directed a new command towards life cycle management of weapon systems. The main
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concern with NSR 11 was the combination of so many diverse functions. The final result
of the study was that the Air Force could implement NSR 11 with or without a merger of
the commands. If the merger was chosen though, it would possibly yield substantial
monetary savings and the AF would have to accomplish a merger very carefully.
At the same time, the commanders of AFSC and AFLC were voicing their
opinions that a merger was a bad idea. In AFLC, General Alfred Hansen stated, “My
concern is that we will take an efficient logistic structure and destroy it to fix an
acquisition function that really needs only fine tuning in the AF” (DMR, 1989). The
AFSC Commander, General Bernard Randolph, agreed. Both commanders presented
success stories of improvements they were making within each command. AFLC was
working on network modernization programs streamlining existing logistics processes.
At the end of 1987, AFSC’s PEOs worked further toward fulfilling the Packard
Commission goals with streamlining of their command procedures. Although the cases
were valid, the possibility of increased functional efficiency and potential manpower
savings was too strong. On 7 August 1989, Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) Larry
Welch broke the news to the AFSC and AFLC commanders that a merger would occur.
Only a couple days later, the merger was put on the back burner as AFSC offered
staff and command manpower reductions of ten percent instead. This counter offer
would leave AFSC HQ with barely 800 personnel assigned. An AFSC command wide
reduction of 5,000 slots was also projected for the coming years. AFLC followed suite
and reduced its structure in the areas of staff offices (from 17 to seven), Defense
Contracting Service (DCS) offices (from nine to five) and direct reporting units (from 23
to eight). The personnel reductions in AFLC HQ were projected to be almost 700 slots
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over the next two years. The total reductions in both commands were projected to
eliminate almost 10,000 positions by the end of FY 94.
Although this effort was noted, the merger wasn’t cancelled. In the fall of 1989,
the Comptroller for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) began releasing
proposals called Defense Management Report Decisions (DMRD). These documents
were designed to propose changes that would ultimately increase economy and
efficiency. Some of the DMRDs seemed openly hostile to the future of AFSC and
AFLC. One DMRD specifically, DMRD 943, called for eliminating most of AFSC and
then combining the key staff with AFLC. The idea for AFLC to absorb AFSC was based
on its larger size and purportedly better organization than AFSC. The proposed savings
by FY 97 were estimated at $562M and a position reduction of approximately 1,300.
DMRD 943 stalled in the Pentagon in late fall of 1990, but by December 1990 talk of
creating a new acquisition and support command was shared with the key players.
Neither command was to be absorbed by the other but a whole new command created in
their place. The final decision to merge AFLC and AFSC can be attributed to SECAF
Donald Rice in early November 1990.

1990’s
General McDonald, Commander of AFSC, and General Ronald Yates,
Commander of AFLC, were tasked to come up with an integration plan for the combining
of their two respective commands. It was determined there were four overall objectives:
(1) to integrate the work force and resources of the two commands, (2) improve the
existing business practices by providing a completely integrated weapon system
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management process throughout a weapon system’s life cycle and (3) to provide a single
face to operational commands that covers all aspects of integrated weapon system
management and (4) establish a clear line of accountability and responsibility (Carlin,
1992). Five goals were also identified: to provide total weapon system support to users,
to enhance the excellence of the work force, to nurture aerospace technology, to fulfill all
aerospace logistics needs, and to establish a world class quality organization and
infrastructure. Even with clear objectives and goals, it was challenging to combine the
personnel of two commands who had previously looked at weapon systems from
different perspectives. The official announcement of the merger was on 3 January 1991,
with scheduled steps to the establishment of the new command on 1 July 1992. WrightPatterson Air Force Base (WPAFB) was chosen over Andrews Air Force Base as the HQ
location.
The initial cost projection for the merger was $14 million, primarily for
movement of personnel to Ohio, both civilian and military. The groundwork for the new
command was performed by a special team, unofficially referred to as the “Magnificent
11.” The team consisted of four AFSC members, four AFLC members, two Air Staff
members and one member from the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). The team did an
outstanding job anticipating problems, using historical lessons, and ultimately building
the new command. They also selected the final name choice, AFMC from a list of five
options that were presented to Secretary Rice a few months prior.
The team broke their job down into special tasks in the format of a Work
Breakdown Structure. The team considered their primary tasks to organize the HQ and to
find a way to implement Integrated Weapon System Management (IWSM). Organization
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of the headquarters was tackled by Mr. Keith Dumas (Assistant DSC Plans and Programs
from AFLC) and Brig Gen John Nauseef (DCS Financial Management from AFSC).
Dumas-Nauseef decided to have each of the deputy and assistant chiefs design their own
offices with guidance letters for assistance. Quality was designed into the new format
instead of inspecting for quality after the fact. The guidance letters were a tool to ensure,
“the headquarters offices conformed to the basic stipulations of the new command”
(Carlin, 1992, p. 43). This included answering a detailed questionnaire as a requirement
with your final input of proposed ideas. For the issues that needed to be settled, it was
determined a meeting of all the senior officials was necessary. An advisory committee
was formed of senior leaders (EXCOM) to work with Dumas-Nauseef. Several meetings
were held that united the senior officers from AFSC and AFLC as a new command. With
all this oversight, General Meyer was concerned the EXCOM might stifle the creativity
of the integration team (Carlin, 1992, p. 45). General Yates again emphasized to the
integration team to remember to be creative.
It was time to start moving people to Ohio but a concern was raised about
assigning everyone to AFLC just because it was already there. Instead, a provisional
AFMC headquarters was established at WPAFB to start the process. In this way,
personnel would become part of AFMC instead of either command feeling absorbed by
the other. The provisional headquarters lasted from 15 April 1991 to 30 June 1992.
While in effect, the skeleton staff of the provisional headquarters laid the groundwork for
each type of office in preparation for their successors. The heart of the provisional
headquarters included financial management, manpower and personnel. Along with this,
the concept of integrated staff ensured AFSC and AFLC functional chiefs prepared joint

72

transition plans for the phased transfer of people and tasks into the new headquarters
(Carlin, 1992, p. 47). This ended up being very successful. As the different areas were
divided into groups, DCS/Requirements stood out as the organization that would truly
blend the perspectives of the two old commands. DCS/Science and Technology brought
in the AFSC side while DCS/Logistics brought the AFLC portion. The final structure of
the new command was completed on 21 May 1991 and approved by General Meyer with
only slight modifications on 6 September 1991.
Manpower considerations also had to be addressed. The combined force of AFSC
and AFLC was approximately 2,600 people. It was decided this figure would gradually
decrease over the next year to avoid a reduction-in-force (RIF) to get to the goal of 2,100.
AFSC previously had an almost equal number of military and civilians; AFLC previously
had significantly more civilians than military. Generals Yates and McDonald agreed to
30% military and 70% civilian ratio for AFMC. Of course, the entire relocation process
was significantly harder for the AFSC folks who were not already in Ohio. They were
concerned about having to move and that AFMC might just be AFLC "disguised."
General Yates announced that all civilians willing to move to Ohio were guaranteed a job
in the new command. If a civilian job was considered a transfer of function (TOF) (not a
job already in Ohio), employees who chose not to move would not have RIF rights and
would be placed in other positions at Andrews Air Force Base. If a civilian job was not a
TOF, employees declining to move were given RIF rights. AFSC personnel were moved
to another temporary organization known as Detachment One until they could be
assigned to AFMC. Out of the 538 civilians who could have moved, 424 chose not to
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move. This 79% non-relocation of personnel alleviated a lot of other potential concerns
about a huge influx of personnel.

Integrated Weapon System Management Challenges
The greatest challenge of the new command was Integrated Weapon System
Management (IWSM), labeled the heart of AFMC by General Yates and General
McDonald. Of the one and a half years spent on formal planning and preparation for the
new command, three months were dedicated to developing the basic concept of IWSM.
General Alfred Hansen, the AFLC Commander from 1987-1989, strove to remove seams
and disconnects from logistical functions and was the first to use the term IWSM (Carlin,
1992). The position of system Program Manager (PM) was created to strengthen the
control of PMs in the 1980’s. Over the years, the term IWSM expanded to include more
than just logistical functions. An AFLC Process Action Team announced that their
overall objective was to “baseline requirements processes as they should work in the
product division concept to position and empower the weapon system management
organization to act more like a SPO.” (Carlin, 1992 p 58) This new concept was
expanded as the two commands were joined. It appeared AFLC was becoming more like
AFSC in operating principles. IWSM was defined as “empowering a single manager
with authority over the widest range of weapons system program decisions and resources
to satisfy customer requirements throughout the life cycle of that weapon system.”
(Carlin, 1992 p 59) Certainly there was risk in the single manager approach but in the
end it was concluded that it possesses the same leaders and personnel with an approved
organizational structure and communications. Integration planners had high hopes for
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the possibility of a single manager being responsible for weapon systems from cradle to
grave, presenting a single face to the user, eliminating the need for PMRT and creating a
seamless organization. Hopefully, this single manager concept would also fully integrate
logistics support for initial and replenishment supplies. In order to turn this concept into
a reality, eight core processes were identified to fit all the elements of managing a
weapon system. The final list consisted of: Requirements, Management, Financial
Management, Systems Engineering and Configuration Management, Test and Evaluation,
Contracting, Technology Insertion, and Logistics.
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Integrated Weapon System Management Development
After three months of developing IWSM, the next 15 months (April 1991 – June
1992) were dedicated to examining and documenting the processes that would make the
IWSM concept work. This time period of “Process Development” consisted of four
phases. First there was program analysis to examine the sub-processes involved in each
program to integrate a way to manage that program by each process. Second, program
integration identified management tasks, the most effective organization and
responsibilities, and location of the designated single manager for each program. Third,
the process analysis phase consisted of Process Action Teams (PAT) looking at each of
the eight core processes. Lastly, in process integration, the findings of the PATs would
be utilized to facilitate the establishment and continuing operation of the new command.
(Carlin, 1992, p 61) The whole process was outlined in a roadmap as a type of charter
for the development of IWSM.
The IWSM project managers had their own tasking, to select programs as
candidates to test the new approach. Programs selected were required to be connected to
both AFLC and AFSC, representative of activities performed at both logistic and product
centers, representative of all phases of the life cycle, and made up a variety of weapon
systems, items and customers served. The final selection consisted of 16 weapon system
programs. As recommendations were made for single manager locations, the IWSM
steering committee realized it had to identify its vision of the long-term relationship of
logistics and product centers. It came up with six possible options but found that it was
not easy to come to an agreement of how to organize the new command. Some of the
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discussions were very heated as workload and jobs became key factors. The committee
did not want to see the logistic centers become only repair depots with all program
management ending up at the product centers. On the other hand, if program
management automatically moved with the system when it became operational, product
centers could end up almost non-existent.
General Yates and General McDonald spent several weeks reviewing the issues
raised by the IWSM steering committee. They revised the roadmap and produced a new
memorandum of agreement to outline changes to the future course of IWSM. It was
decided that the program managers would initially be placed at the product centers but
would work closely with the logistics centers as well. When a program reached
“maturity,” the manager would move with the program to the logistics center. Programs
that had already been partially or completely transferred would be handled individually.
Another major change was the inclusion of Air Force Communications Command
(AFCC) in the IWSM experiment; this would add 5 additional AFCC programs to the 16
test programs selected for IWSM. The question of AFCC’s fate had already been under
discussion with the combination of AFLC and AFSC. A study was undertaken to look at
“organizational alternatives leading to the merger of AFSC/AFLC/AFCC C4 elements
under AFMC.” (Carlin, 1992, p 68)

Integrated Weapon System Management Obstacles
As the IWSM experiment progressed, various obstacles arose. Valuable time was
wasted when it was initially assumed that the IWSM steering committee would designate
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the single managers. In reality, only the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Acquisition, John J. Welch, Jr. had the authority to do this. There were also different
procedures in place in the different commands that would need to be reorganized. Some
of the affected processes involved contracting, systems engineering, configuration
management, and technology insertion. The overall goal was a clear, consistent approach
that all parties could agree on. One of the largest problems was financial management.
In the past, Congress gave large sums of money to AFSC for development of a product
that it could spend freely; AFLC was not given the same freedom. Its money was divided
in separate pots for separate functions; this made it difficult to transfer funds between
pots. Sorting out all the funding issues was a huge challenge.
By the end of 1991, the 21 candidate programs were well on their way into the
IWSM approach. A second edition of the roadmap was also produced to include what
had happened so far. This document defined the SPO as “the integrated AFMC
organization responsible for cradle to grave military system management” (Carlin, 1992).
The System Program Director (SPD) was defined as “the individual in an AFMC SPO
who is ultimately responsible and accountable for decisions and resources in overall
program execution…the single face to the user who oversee the seamless processes…the
SPC is the designated title for the single manager of a program who reports to a PEO or
Designated Acquisition Commander.” (Carlin, 1992)
Along with Roadmap II, a White Paper was put out by General Yates and General
McDonald on the IWSM effort, the future of the Air Force and the pending establishment
of AFMC. Policy formulation ensued and continued through AFMC’s activation. Still a
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lingering concern was the management position of the logistics centers, which was not
clearly stated.

AFMC: The New Command
During the creation of AFMC on 11 July 1992, the IWSM controversy remained
intense. That same day, Secretary Rice and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General
Merrill McPeak, produced a policy memorandum on their views of the roles of the
product and logistic centers. As soon as General Yates took command of AFMC he
issued a policy letter to clear up any misunderstanding regarding management. Weapon
system management would be conducted at both product and logistics centers. The
extent to how this would be implemented was the only part that was still undefined. This
unresolved issue simmered for the next several years.
Three key elements of AFSC were used as the backbone of AFMC strategic
planning. The first was known as Command Management Framework. This consisted of
four major parts of AFMC’s mission: science and technology, systems acquisition, test
and evaluation, and base operating support. The goal was to focus attention where it was
needed for success in these areas. The second was a quarterly conference called
Horizons. Each conference would address one of the four mission areas so all four would
be covered each year. The third was the implementation of metrics. Although it was
clear that metrics should be a tool for measuring progress toward a goal, no specific
structure was specified.
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For the entire year prior to AFMC activation, General Yates conducted off sites
specifically to address the new command. These four conferences created the statements
of mission, vision, goals and objectives endorsed by the commander. The group was
focused on providing lasting capabilities to AFMC customers. Some obstacles were
found in decreasing workforce and funding levels; increasing environmental costs; lack
of funding flexibility; the size, diversity and complexity of the command they were
creating; and the sheer number of initiatives that were being proposed in the name of the
new command. (Carlin, 1992) After much discussion, five goals were decided upon that
were broad enough to apply to the entire command. The AFMC vision was also
developed, “Be an integrated team delivering and sustaining the best products for the
world’s best Air Force.” (Carlin, 1992) The mission statement developed was, “Through
integrated management of research, development, test, acquisition, and support we
advance and use technology to acquire and sustain superior systems in partnership with
our customers. We perform continuous product and process improvement throughout the
life cycle. As an integral part of the Air Force war fighting team, we contribute to
affordable combat superiority, readiness and sustainability” (Carlin, 1992). It was
decided that the objectives had to be not only meaningful, but quantifiable and
measurable, applicable throughout the command, understandable at all levels, be of
enduring importance, reflect consensus, contain a target date for completion when
appropriate, and be directly related to the five goals. The hard part was figuring out how
to measure progress towards a goal. General Yates himself observed that, “we can
expect to revise the metrics 100 times.” (Carlin, 1992)
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As the activation date drew closer, General Yates remained focused on integrating
acquisition and logistics into one unified command. Logistics was renamed sustainment
and the proposed direction included integrated processes between the two areas. This
would continue to evolve as the new command matured.
In 1998, a group of senior AFMC planners undertook a reexamination of the
roles, responsibilities and relationships within the organizational structure of the
command. (Carlin 2001) This new concept was titled Centers of Excellence (COE). It
was realized that AFMC was not operating as efficiently as it should be and IWSM was
not working as designed. In some ways, AFLC and AFSC were still operating
independently within AFMC. After designing a new framework, the whole idea was
completely abandoned as AFMC feared congressional opposition to making changes.
A major incident occurred in 1998 that caused a new look at the engineering of a
weapon system. A B-1B bomber crash, due to a fire in the plane’s electrical system,
started an inquiry into the safety engineering of the system. The assignment and
understanding of responsibility for this accident was questioned; AFMC was the owner
of the weapon system and therefore considered responsible for its flight and ground
safety.
General George Babbitt, AFMC Commander at the time, pronounced the PEO
system to be a dysfunctional mechanism that worked because people made it work.
(Carlin, 2001) General Babbitt felt that the reporting responsibilities of single managers
needed clarification. This was a question AFMC thought they had answered back in
1992. He directed product center technical responsibility for comprehensive insight into
their product line, including periodic evaluation of a product line’s technical “health” and
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the chief engineer in support of a single manager is responsible and accountable for the
operational safety, suitability, and effectiveness of their weapon system throughout the
life cycle. (Carlin, 2001)
In July 2001, AFMC sponsored the creation of the Depot Maintenance Review
Team (DMRT). Their primary objectives were to improve depot maintenance support to
the warfighter and improve depot maintenance financial performance (McCoy, 2003).
The depots focused on reengineering their processes to reduce flow time and increase
production. The original DMRT evolved into Depot Maintenance Reengineering and
Transformation, which looked at workload and production, workforce, materiel support,
financial management, infrastructure, information technology, organizational structure
and metrics.
With the tragedy of September 11, 2001 still fresh in everyone's minds, AFMC
took another look at the way they did business.
General Lester Lyles, AFMC Commander at this time, stated "The
administration is setting new priorities and a new strategy for the nation's
defense. The recent terrorist attacks on America dramatically and tragically
emphasized the need for these changes. We in AFMC need to help shape and
lead that change by acquiring and sustaining the new capabilities the Air
Force will need in the future to maintain its dominant combat edge. If we're
to continue providing world class materiel support to our customers, we must
clearly understand their changing requirements and periodically review how
we do business," (Faulkner, 2001).
To fulfill the mission of homeland defense is a two-step process for AFMC. First
is the "pull" where the warfighter establishes requirements for new technologies. Then
comes the "push" when AFMC provides the solution. AFMC has many technological
programs and initiatives that can be provided at increased speed when there is a
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requirement and funding is made available. AFMC has sustained the capabilities that
were dominant in major conflicts like Desert Storm, Deliberate Force, Allied Force,
Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom (Martin, 2004i). Through the establishment of the
Homeland Defense and Combat Support Sector within XP, AFMC hopes to ensure 24/7
capability to respond to critical requests.
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Appendix B: Survey Instrument

2004 AFMC Product Center
Reorganization Survey
Purpose: The purpose of this survey is threefold: (1) to determine if the 2004 AFMC Product Center
reorganization has met General Martin’s four intended objectives, (2) its effects on AFMC employee job
satisfaction and (3) to gather some general opinions about the reorganization. The four objectives are
clearly stated within the survey itself.
The data collected will be used to identify any areas that may need additional attention as a result of the
reorganization. The analysis of the data collected, corresponding research, and conclusions reached will be
documented within a current AFIT student thesis.
This survey has been endorsed by HQ AFMC/XPM for distribution throughout the AFMC Product
Centers. To access the survey simply click on the link listed below. The survey itself should take no
longer than 10 minutes.
Participation: Your COMPLETELY VOLUNTARY participation is greatly appreciated. Your decision to
not participate or to withdraw from participation will not jeopardize your relationship with the Air Force
Institute of Technology, the U.S. Air Force, or the Department of Defense.
Confidentiality: We ask for some demographic information in order to interpret results more accurately;
ALL ANSWERS ARE ANONYMOUS. No one other than the research team will see your completed
survey. Various reports summarizing trends may be published as part of the thesis process.
Contact information: Any questions or comments about the survey, please contact Capt Joy Mikulcik at
joy.mikulcik@afit.edu.
Web Link to Survey: XXXXXXXXXXXXX

Captain Joy Mikulcik
AFIT/ENV BLDG 641
2950 P Street
Wright-Patterson AFB OH 45433-7765
Email: joy.mikulcik@afit.edu
Phone: DSN 785-3636, ext. 6553, commercial (937) 255-3636, ext. 6553
Fax: DSN 986-4699; commercial (937) 656-4699
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Please respond to the following statements based on the scale provided:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Slightly
Disagree

Neither Agree
Nor Disagree

Slightly
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

General Martin’s Objective 1: We wanted to strengthen support to operational commands and
warfighters in the field. AFMC’s number one job is to deliver war-winning capabilities on time and
on cost. If we can’t do this for all weapon systems then we are no adding value.
1. I feel the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization has succeeded in strengthening support to
operational commands (ACC, USAFE, PACAF, AFSOC, AMC, AFSPC)
2. I feel the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization has succeeded in strengthening support to
warfighters in the field
3. My organization has experienced improvements in cost management as a result of the reorganization
4. My organization has experienced improvements in schedule management as a result of the
reorganization
5. My organization has experienced improvements in its ability to deliver war winning capabilities as a
result of the reorganization
6. I feel the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization has strengthened our support to operational
commands because they better understand where and how to find acquisition assistance

General Martin’s Objective 2: We must continue supporting and maturing the PEO realignment.
This will continue the age-old debate of when an acquisition program shifts into the sustainment
phase.
7. Overall, I feel well informed of the PEO realignment changes
8. I feel the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization has supported the PEO realignment
9. I feel the PEO realignment has matured as a result of the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization
10. I feel the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization has detracted from supporting the PEO
realignment
11. I am well informed of the changes in PEO functional areas
12. I am well informed of the changes in PEO chain of command

13. I feel when the PEO functions were less effective when they were in Washington,
DC (SAF/AQ)
14. I feel PEO functions are now at the right levels in AFMC
15. My organization has experienced significant changes in acquisition program management as a result of
the PEO realignment
16. I feel the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization has improved our communication with SAF/AQ
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Please respond to the following statements based on the scale provided:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Slightly
Disagree

Neither Agree
Nor Disagree

Slightly
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

General Martin’s Objective 3: The need to structure AFMC similar to the way all other Air Force
major commands operate. The incorporation of the standard wing/group/squadron structure will
make it easier for people to understand AFMC. It will also ease in identification of responsibilities of
each organization.
17. I feel the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization has successfully restructured AFMC similar to
all other Air Force MAJCOMS
18. I support the standardization of wing, group and squadron titles
19. My organizational structure positively changed as a result of the 2004 AFMC Product Center
reorganization
20. I clearly understand the new structure
21. My reporting chain positively changed as a result of the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization
22. I clearly understand my new reporting chain
23. I have a positive opinion about the removal of the organizational title “System Program Office (SPO)”
24. I feel the new structure allows me to work more effectively
25. I feel the new structure allows me to work more efficiently
26. I feel the new structure makes it easier for other MAJCOMs to find and communicate with AFMC
offices

General Martin’s Objective 4: We must structure the command with a capability-based versus
platform-based focus. Rather than having separate organizations for every weapon system, they will
be grouped based on similar capabilities. Platforms can then share the responsibility and knowledge
base among similar systems.
27. I feel the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization has successfully created a capability-based
versus platform-based focus
28. I felt the previous platform-based focus was working well for AFMC
29. I feel the new capability-based focus is working well for AFMC
30. I feel my organization is now grouped more effectively with other capabilities
31. I feel my organization is now grouped more efficiently with other capabilities
32. I feel the new capability-based focus make sit easier to communicate and share ideas across programs
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Please respond to the following statements based on the scale provided:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Slightly
Disagree

Neither Agree
Nor Disagree

Slightly
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

General Questions:
33. I feel the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization has met its intended objectives
34. The 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization has improved my morale at work
35. I feel the Product Centers are more effective under the new structure
36. I feel the Product Centers are more efficient under the new structure
37. I feel my organization has adapted fairly easily to changes related to the reorganization
38. I feel I was well informed about the objectives/goals of the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization
PRIOR to any actual changes occurring
39. I feel I was well informed about the actual changes that would occur in the 2004 AFMC Product
Center reorganization PRIOR to any actual changes occurring
Job satisfaction questions:
40. I am satisfied with my current job
41. The amount of work I am expected to do at my job is reasonable
42. I am satisfied with the amount of resources I have to do my job
43. I feel my job is important to the organization
44. I get a sense of satisfaction from the work I do
45. I can get my job done in a normal duty day timeframe (8 hours)
46. I am proud to work in AFMC
47. I am satisfied with the level of work required for my job
48. I know what my job responsibilities are
49. I often have to bend a rule or policy to get the job done
50. I am able to act independently of my supervisor in performing my job
51. I can help in making decisions, which affects my work in a positive manner
52. I don’t mind spending additional hours at work to complete my tasks
Organizational Commitment:
53. I feel secure with my job as long as I am getting the work done
54. If another organization offered me a promotion or pay raise I would leave
55. Management at my organization acts sincerely
56. I really feel as if the organizations problems are my problems as well
57. I don’t feel a sense of pride or accomplishment as a result of the work I do
58. I feel I have too few options to consider leaving this organization
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Demographics:
59. What is your age?
o 19 or younger
o 20-29
o 30-39
o 40-49
o 50-59
o 60 or older
60. What is your gender?
o Male
o Female
61. What is your marital status?
o Single
o Married
o Divorced
o Widowed
62. Civilian or Military?
o DoD Civilian
o Retired military member now working as a civilian
o Retired military member now working as a contractor
o Active duty officer (not prior enlisted)
o Active duty officer (prior enlisted)
o Active duty enlisted
o Contractor
63. Rank? _____
64. AFSC/Occupational Code?_____
65. Level of Education?
o GED/High School
o Some College
o Associated Degree
o Bachelors Degree
o Graduate Degree
o Doctorate
o Other
66. Time in current position? _____ year(s) ____ months
67. Years assigned in AFMC(includes AF Systems Cmd and/or AF Logistics Command)? ____ year(s)
____ months
68. Years in other Air Force Commands? _____ year(s) ____ months
69. Years assigned to Secretariat or Headquarters for the USAF? _____year(s) ______ months
70. Total time working for the Air Force (combine military and civilian duty)? _____ year(s) ____
months
71. What is your current AFMC Product Center duty location:
o Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH
o Electronic Systems Center, Hanscom AFB, MA
o Air Armament Center, Eglin AFB, FL
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Open ended questions:
72. What is working well for you as a result of the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization?
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
73. Please identify any areas of concern for you as a result of the 2004 AFMC Product Center
reorganization.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
74. Please tell us anything else about your experience with the 2004 AFMC Product Center reorganization
that you think we should know for future reorganization improvement.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________

Definitions:
Matured - to evolve toward or reach full development
Successfully - having succeeded or being marked by a favorable outcome
Effective - producing or capable of producing a desired effect
Efficient - acting or producing effectively with a minimum of waste, expense, or unnecessary effort or
exhibiting a high ratio of output to input
Capability Based - grouped by like use, design or specific purpose (fighter attack, training, etc.)
Platform Based - each item has its own intended military structure or vehicle and typically does not share
information with others
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Appendix C: Human Subjects Training Certification

CITI Course in The Protection of Human Research Subjects
Tuesday, December 20, 2005
CITI Course Completion Record
for Joy Mikulcik

To whom it may concern:
On 12/20/2005, Joy Mikulcik (username=jmikulcik; Employee Number=) completed all CITI
Program requirements for the Basic CITI Course in The Protection of Human Research Subjects.

Learner Institution: U.S. Air Force
Learner Group: Group 5
Learner Group Description: This course is suitable for investigators and staff conducting
research with human subjects at the AIR FORCE RESEARCH LABORATORY (AFRL) and for
investigators and staff at other sites conducting RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TESTING, AND
EVALUATION (RDT&E) activities with human subjects.
Contact Information:
Gender: Female
Please Provide Your Current Performance Site: USAF Research Laboratory at Wright
Patterson AFB
Department: AFIT
Which course do you plan to take?: Air Force Research Laboratory Course
Role in human subjects research: Student Researcher
Mailing Address:
Email: joysjm@sbcglobal.net
Office Phone: 937-848-4423
Home Phone:

Date
completed

The Required Modules for Group 5 are:
Introduction

12/19/05
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History and Ethical Principles - SBR

12/19/05

Privacy and Confidentiality - SBR

12/19/05

Basic Institutional Review Board (IRB) Regulations and Review Process

12/20/05

Informed Consent

12/20/05

Social and Behavioral Research for Biomedical Researchers

12/20/05

Records-Based Research

12/20/05

Research With Protected Populations - Vulnerable Subjects: An
Overview

12/20/05

International Research

12/20/05

Workers as Research Subjects-A Vulnerable Population

12/20/05

Conflicts of Interest in Research Involving Human Subjects

12/20/05

U.S. Air Force

12/20/05
Date
completed

Additional optional modules completed:
Defining Research with Human Subjects - SBR

12/20/05

For this Completion Report to be valid, the learner listed above must be affiliated
with a CITI participating institution. Falsified information and unauthorized use of
the CITI course site is unethical, and may be considered scientific misconduct by your
institution.
Paul Braunschweiger Ph.D.
Professor, University of Miami
Director Office of Research Education
CITI Course Coordinator

91

Appendix D: Human Subjects Request for Exemption and Amendments
19 Sep 05

MEMORANDUM FOR AFIT/ENV
AFIT/ENR
AFRL/HEH
IN TURN
FROM: AFIT/ENV/GRD
SUBJECT: Request for Exemption from Human Experimentation Requirements (AFI
40-402): Thesis Research, AFIT/ENV, 2004 Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC)
Product Center Reorganization Survey
1. Request exemption from Human Experimentation Requirements of AFI 40-402 for the
proposed 2004 AFMC Product Center (PC) Reorganization Survey (attached) to be
conducted in conjunction with thesis research at the Air Force Institute of Technology.
Purpose of this study is to determine if the 2004 reorganization of AFMC PCs has
successfully met the AFMC/CC’s four key objectives: to strengthen support to
operational commands and warfighters in the field, to continue supporting and maturing
the PEO realignment, to structure AFMC similar to the way all other Air Force major
commands operate and to structure the command with a capability-based versus
platform-based focus. The results of this study will be utilized by AFMC/XPM as input
data for SAF/AQ to gauge the success of the PC reorganization.
2. This request is based on the Code of Federal Regulations, title 32, part 219, section
101, paragraph (b) (2); Research activities that involve human subjects will be exempt
when the research involves the use of survey procedures provided (i) information
obtained cannot be directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects, and (ii)
disclosure of subjects' responses does not place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil
liability, financial strain, employability or reputation ruin.
Methodology used to collect information for organizational theory research is based on
survey procedures. The following information is provided to show cause for such an
exemption:
2.1. Equipment and facilities: No special equipment or facilities will be used.
2.2. Subjects: Subjects will be employees of AFMC Product Centers. HQ
AFMC/XPM will send the link to the web-based survey, via electronic mail, to
the Product Center commanders for distribution to all employees.
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2.3. Timeframe: Data will be collected via online survey over a period of 5-10
days
2.4. Description of the survey: The survey is broken down into seven main
sections to measure different areas: Objective 1, Objective 2, Objective 3,
Objective 4, job satisfaction, organizational commitment and demographics.
Each section has specific measurable variables selected based on their correlation
to the overall section descriptor. Personal information will remain anonymous.
2.5. Data collected: No identifying information, such as names or social security
numbers, will be obtained through this survey. Data collected on individual
subjects includes: Age, Gender, Marital Status, Civilian or Military, Rank, Years
of Education, Duty Location, Years in Job, Years in AFMC, Prior Military
Service, Years in AF/government work, etc. All final data will be reported
collectively.
2.6. Informed consent: Subjects selected will include all employees of the AFMC
Product Centers. Since respondents will only answer voluntarily there is a
concern that the response will be biased. No adverse action will be taken against
those who choose not to participate. Subjects are made aware of the nature and
purpose of the research, sponsors of the research, and disposition of the survey
results. A copy of the Privacy Act Statement of 1974 is presented for their
review.
2.7. Risks to Subjects: Individual responses of the subjects will not be disclosed.
This eliminates any risks to the subjects as noted in paragraph 2. There are no
anticipated medical risks associated with this study.
3. If you have any questions about this request, please contact the Faculty Advisor,
Major Carolyn Macola – Phone 785-3636 x4511; E-mail –
Carolyn.macola@afit.edufit.edu or the Graduate Student, Captain Joy Mikulcik – Phone
684-7652, E-mail – joy.mikulcik@afit.edu.
//signed//
JOY D. MIKULCIK, Capt, USAF
Graduate Student, AFIT/ENV/GRD
//signed//
CAROLYN M. MACOLA, Maj, USAF
Faculty Advisor, AFIT/ENV
Attachment:
2004 AFMC Product Center Reorganization Survey
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29 September 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR AFIT/ENV
AFIT/ENR
AFIT/HEH
IN TURN
FROM: AFIT/ENV/GRD
SUBJECT: Amendment to Human Subject Review case F-WR-2005-0066-E (2005040): Thesis Research, AFIT/ENV/GRD, 2004 Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC)
Product Center Reorganization Survey
1. Request approval of amendment to Human Subject Review case F-WR-2005-0066-E
(2005-040): Thesis Research, AFIT/ENV/GRD, 2004 Air Force Materiel Command
(AFMC) Product Center Reorganization Survey.
2. Therefore, please amend as follows:
a. Please remove the attachment that was submitted
originally and replace with the survey attached. Attached
is a revision of the original proposal. The revisions include
1) the deletion of one of the survey questions, (“Unit
currently assigned to),” and 2) change of spacing of
questions to improve readability
3. If you have any questions about this request, please contact Capt Joy D. Mikulcik
(Joy.Mikulcik@afit.edu) or Maj Carolyn M. Macola (937)255-3636 ext. 7386
(Carolyn.Macola@afit.edu)

//signed//
Joy D. Mikulcik, Capt, USAF
Graduate Student, AFIT/ENV/GRD

//signed//
Carolyn M. Macola, Maj, USAF
Faculty Advisor, AFIT/ENV
Attachment: 2004 AFMC Product Center Reorganization Survey
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Appendix E: Human Subjects Approval- AFRL
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR FORCEMATERIELCOMMAND
.

WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE OHIO

03 November 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR: Joy D. Miku1cik,Capt, USAF
AFIT/ENV/GRD
FROM: AFRL/Wtight Site Institutional Review Board
SUBJECT: Request for exemption from human experimentation requirements
1.. Protocol title: 2004 Air Force Material COlllilland (AFMq
Survey

Product Center Reorganization

2. Protocol number: F-WR-2005-0066-E
3. The above protocol has been reviewed by the AFRL Wright Site IRB and determined to be
exempt from IRB oversight and human subject research requirements per 32 CFR 219.101(b)(2)
whi<;;hexempts "research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude,
achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures or observation of public behavior."

4. Data collection tor this study can begin immediately. The IRB must be notified if there is any
changeto the designor proceduresof the researchto be conducted.Otherwise,no furtheraction
is required.
5. For questions or concerns, please contact the IRB administrator, Helen Jennings at (937) 2550311 x232 or helen~iennings(cV,~1Jafb.af.mi1.
All inquiries and con-espondenceconcerning this
protocol should include the protocol number and name of the primary investigator.

-.,/

JEFFl\EY BIDINGER, Maj, USAF, MC, FS
Chair, AFRL/Wright Site IRB

f
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Appendix F: Human Subjects Request for Approval and Amendment - AFPC
17 October 2005
MEMORANDUM FOR AFPC/DPSAS
FROM: CAPTAIN JOY MIKULCIK
SUBJECT: Request for Survey Control Number for 2004 Air Force Materiel Command
(AFMC) Product Center Reorganization Survey
1. Please consider this letter as a formal request for a survey control number. As part of
my graduate degree thesis I would like to conduct a web-based survey. The tentative
administration date for the survey is November 2005.
2. Pursuant to AFI 36-2601, paragraph 2, the following information is provided:
2.1 State the purpose and justification for the proposed research (include
name of AF sponsor and how agency will benefit from the survey findings): The
purpose of this study is to determine if the 2004 reorganization of AFMC PCs has
successfully met the AFMC/CC’s four key objectives: to strengthen support to
operational commands and warfighters in the field, to continue supporting and maturing
the PEO realignment, to structure AFMC similar to the way all other Air Force major
commands operate and to structure the command with a capability-based versus
platform-based focus. Sponsorship of this survey is provided by HQ AFMC/XPM,
Colonel Dan Badger and Lieutenant Colonel Kimberly Daeger.
2.2 Indicate how you will use the survey results: The results of this study will
be utilized by AFMC/XPM as input data for SAF/AQ to gauge the success of the PC
reorganization and for me personally to fulfill the thesis requirement for graduation from
the Air Force Institute of Techology with a masters degree in Research and Development
Management in March 2006.
2.3. Provide a POC with phone number: If you have any questions about this
request, please contact my Faculty Advisor, Major Carolyn Macola – Phone 785-3636
x4511; E-mail – Carolyn.macola@afit.edufit.edu or myself, Captain Joy Mikulcik –
Phone 684-7652, E-mail – joy.mikulcik@afit.edu.
2.4. Identify which population is of interest, how large the proposed sample
size is, and how the sample will be selected: Subjects selected will include all
employees (civilian, military and contractors) of the AFMC Product Centers. Their
responses will be completely voluntary. The approximate number of personnel contacted
will be 5,250. This includes approximately 850 personnel at the Air Armament Center
(AAC), Eglin Air Force Base, Florida; approximately 2,450 personnel at the Aeronautical
Systems Center (ASC), Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; and approximately 1,950
personnel at the Electronic Systems Center (ESC), Hanscom Air Force Base,
Massachusetts.
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2.5 Tell how you expect to collect the data, such as computer-administered
survey, mail-out survey, etc.: Data will be collected via online survey over a period of
5-10 days.
2.6 Provide a copy of the proposed date collection instrument: please see
attachment.
2.7. Specify when and how often people will be surveyed: Respondents will
only be surveyed once, tentatively scheduled for early November.
3. If you have any questions about this request, please contact me directly at (937) 6847652 or via e-mail at joy.mikulcik@afit.edu. Thank you for your help

//signed//
JOY D. MIKULCIK, Capt, USAF
Graduate Student, AFIT/ENV/GRD

Attachments:
1. 2004 AFMC Product Center Reorganization Survey
2. Human Subjects Request for Exemption Letter
3. Amendment to the Human Subjects Request for Exemption Letter
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25 October 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR AFPC/DPSAS
FROM: CAPTAIN JOY MIKULCIK
SUBJECT: Amendment to Request for Survey Control Number for the 2004 Air Force
Materiel Command (AFMC) Product Center Reorganization Survey
1. Request approval of amendment to Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) Product
Center Reorganization Survey request submitted 17 October 2005. A revised copy of the
survey instrument is attached.
2. Changes include the addition of one question:
71. What is your current AFMC Product Center duty location?
 Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright-Patterson AFB,
OH
 Electronic Systems Center, Hanscom AFB, MA
 Air Armament Center, Eglin AFB, FL
3. If you have any questions about this request, please contact Capt Joy D. Mikulcik
(937) 684-7652 (Joy.Mikulcik@afit.edu) or Maj Carolyn M. Macola (937) 255-3636 ext.
4511 (Carolyn.Macola@afit.edu)

//signed//
Joy D. Mikulcik, Capt, USAF
Graduate Student, AFIT/ENV/GRD

//signed//
Carolyn M. Macola, Maj, USAF
Faculty Advisor, AFIT/ENV
Attachment: 2004 AFMC Product Center Reorganization Survey
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Appendix G: Human Subjects Approval – AFPC

14 DECEMBER 2005
MEMORANDUM FOR CAPT JOY D. MIKULCIK
FROM: AFPC/DPAPS
SUBJECT: Request for Survey Approval
We have reviewed your request to conduct the 2004 Air Force Materiel Command
(AFMC) Product Center Reorganization Survey and approved it for use for Air Force
personnel assigned to the Air Armament Center (AAC) at Eglin AFB; the Aeronautical
Systems Center (ASC) at Wright-Patterson AFB; and the Electronic Systems Center
(ESC) at Hanscom AFB. We have assigned a Survey Control Number (SCN) of USAF
SCN 05-130; valid through 30 June 2006. Please ensure that the SCN and expiration
date appear within the survey, survey instructions and appropriate web site as well as on
the initial document/e-mail introducing the survey.
With regard to the survey and its associated results, it is important to draw your attention
to the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Under the FOIA, the public
can request the results of your survey. Furthermore, if the results will be released outside
the Air Force, please follow proper approval procedures through Public Affairs before
the results are released.
Questions or concerns can be directed to me at DSN 665-2448. We wish you
much success with your data collection effort.

//Signed//
LOUIS M. DATKO
Chief, Air Force Survey Program

99

Appendix H: Human Subjects Completion Letter
17 February 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR AFRL/HEH
FROM: AFIT/ENV/GRD
2950 Hobson Way
WPAFB, OH 45433
SUBJECT: Final Report for 2004 AFMC Product Center Reorganization Survey
Status of study: Completed.

//signed//
JOY D. MIKULCIK, Capt, USAF
Graduate Student, AFIT/ENV/GRD

//signed//
CAROLYN M. MACOLA, Maj, USAF
Faculty Advisor, AFIT/ENV
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Appendix I: Answers to Survey Question Number 72
Question 72. What is working well for you as a result of the 2004 AFMC Product Center
reorganization?
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•

It had absolutely no impact on my work. Change was just cosmetic from my stand
point.
I was unaware of the changes since I recently arrived at AFMC. My experience
has been the "grumblings" of co-workers who seem to collectively view this as a
change for the sake of change.
I'm in a staff position, so I've not seen a lot of change/impact on my office.
Wing, Group, Squad, Flight re-org
Capability and Results Focus
Having the PEO local is definitely beneficial.
Users better understand our organization structure with Wing/Group/Squadron
structure.
Ability to work well with others to complete my job.
Having the PEO local works well for program decisions and information passing,
but leaves a hole in the Washington arena for program advocation.
Senior Leadership involvement
Opportunities for Military Command slots for our AD military officers.
I have not really seen much improvement (as far as my job area is concerned)
from the previous organizational structure.
Definitely more priority to meet the users need- -mission orientation-strategic
focus/results oriented -performance based incentives
It is more in line with the rest of the military structure so it is easier to understand.
The commanders assigned at the squadron level are a move in the right direction.
I'm getting commander credit which is important in the rest of the AF.
Nothing has changed other than organization names.
Promotion potential.
Much more "busy" work
My job is to support my customer in a technical support role. The re-organization
just complicates my daily work schedule with all the additional overhead.
Nothing changed within organization, just confusion on "who are we today"
(what title, numbered or not)? So work goes on.
The whole system seems to work well. I entered the AF after the PEO
realignment and in the beginning of the restructuring into Wings. So, I didn't
know the organizational structure prior to the changes. But, it makes sense to me
how it is organized now.
Making the Product Center Commander the PEO and grouping weapon systems
according to their function. (This was accomplished before and without becoming
Wings, Groups, Squadrons and Flights!!!!!)
A lot of people can't find what org I am in know so I don't get as many calls.
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•

•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

This kind of stuff is well and good but for most of use we could care less as long
as the work we do is of value. For the junior force, it's just another waste of
government money trying to improve already broken government processes. It's
like all that strategic plan stuff no one reads. Who cares where the PEO sits, it's
still just as hard to get something through OSD no matter where someone is.
The initiative to group similar weapons capabilities into the same organization
has been very helpful in sharing very useful business and technical information.
For the most part line control of employees
Essentially, nothing has changed for my position as an engineer. My
responsibilities did not change, nor did my reporting chain. So, things remained
status quo. Things were going smoothly before and after the change.
Generally, don't see much change.
I do understand the sq/wg structure better than the old SPO names. I agree with
functionally aligning similar projects in the same 'wing'. I like the Weapons PEO
being here at Eglin where the weapons are planned, developed, tested, and
acquired. We brief him regularly (6/times/yr) and discuss issues. Makes more
sense than being in Wash DC.
Better team work effort due to all playing on the same team.
Little change. The deck chairs have been rearranged
More opportunities for deserving military members to assume command
positions.
Less cumbersome policies and procedures; first class learning organization-training is key to enhanced job knowledge and increased productivity
Because of the new wing structure, there are greater opportunities within the
organization which may be taken advantage of without a lot of paperwork or
administrative headaches.
Very little as a result of the reorganization, which was one of the typical periodic
reshuffles making it look like leadership is doing something important, but that
really makes the bureaucracy even worse to deal with.
Nothing!!!
Focus at multiple levels on personnel.
Nothing! I lost my supervisory position after 15 years. I was moved out of my
career field. I have been placed in an oppressive organization with little in terms
of goals and visions and micromanagement for transactional functions. IT
support, resources and capabilities are a mere shadow of what I was accustomed
to having. I no longer know what office to contact for what and many people have
been shifted thus losing the continuity that once existed. Gen Anzalone once
announced at a public meeting that the purpose of the reorg was to provide
military a career path. It was "hoped" that the new civilian system, NSPS, would
provide for them. I see many leader positions being filled by military very junior
and not knowledgeable compared to the civilians in that organization. The
military are receiving credit for the work of the civilians and have a path while
many good civilians suffocate. NSPS will only exasperate the situation by
creating the biggest "good old boy" system known to the Air Force.
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•
•

•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

In spite of the reorg, the capabilities based focus works.
Really I have seen very little change in anything that affects me. My disagree
statements were not that things were going bad, but basically that I disagree that I
see anything going better because of the re-org. I would say that the best benefit
from the re-org would be that younger officers may have stronger promotion
potential.
Nothing changed for me as a functional, other than the confusion of the new
names.
Knowledge
Having the PEO at Hanscom is a big improvement over the old model. Our PEO
has a lot more involvement in the programs in his portfolio than he would
otherwise.
Being briefed and aware of the current changes
Not answering this question but overall comment: If the definitions below were at
the beginning of the questionnaire, I missed them. If you have a chance, I would
move them to the front of the instrument. The capability based improvements
outweigh any of the negatives associated with the reorganization. I question the
time energy and cost to the tax payer with the reorg in general. I believe we could
have achieved the same outcome with less negative impact to the organization.
Consistency of Wing, Group, Squadron structure across the Air Force.
Understanding an actual chain of command. (although, you still have multiple
reporting chains--PMs, CFOs, FM functionals, Group, Wing agencies outside of
your chain)
Organizational/reporting structure is a lot clearer
I know very little about the reorganization. My squadron is a tenant unit of the
AAC Eglin, and was already structured with Wing, Group, Squadron, and Flights
(to a certain extent).
My job really didn't change as I work for a "Functional" organization.
The wing/group/sq structure provides a great sense of camaraderie
I see the reorganization as an unnecessary step backward that was motivated
primarily to create more Commander positions for field grade officers.
In my last job, the AFMC structure was more recognizable to the operator -- less
ambiguous.
The program that I work seems to have higher visibility.
The Major AF Product Centers reorganized IAW General Martins & AF
Organizational Structure
No significant changes.
Wing structure makes communication easier. Integration among like systems.
I better understand Industry
Morale at ESC has been bad for years, so it is hard to determine what can be
attributed to the reorgs.
Nothing very much! I miss the SPO organization structure.
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Not much there still seems to be confusion. I will grant you the fact that at least it
is organized now.
Minimal changes at the office/working level--maintains work continuity.
In my position as Human Resources Manager for one of the functional areas, I
now deal directly with the 4 Wing CFO's, as opposed to the 8-10 SPO CFO's.
That gives me less people to negotiate with, but it also gives me less flexibility.
There is no detectable positive change.
The movement of the PEO from DC to the product center headquarters was good.
Clear lines of communication.
Co-located PEO with program offices.
Knowing where to get answers for air to ground or air to air.
Better training, improved communications across orgs, improved speed to get the
work done
Chain of command reporting.
There are clearer lines on command. It's just too bad not everyone uses them.

92 respondents selected “no answer” to this question.
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Appendix J: Answers to Survey Question Number 73
Question 73. Please identify any areas of concern for you as a result of the 2004 AFMC
Product Center reorganization.
•

•
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I was assigned as the Director and then CC for a SPO from May 03 - Jun 05.
Although we reorg'd the levels of reporting did not decrease. The intermediate
level actually became more controlling; I and my successor ask "why do you even
need us?" 2) I do not believe the Wg, GRP, SQDR designation will help acq orgs
execute any better, in fact, I believe it will take away managements attention of
cost, schedule, performance, issues.
Negative impact on morale. From what I've observed, the message either didn't
get out or didn't make a lasting impression on the workforce.
Getting all the organization names nailed down - figuring out who is who. Also,
there is still confusion regarding the authority of the Wings/DRG versus the ALC
-- who's the boss? Growth of employees via moving around to gain different
experiences is more difficult now that the "functional" director no longer "owns"
the positions. This also makes it more difficult to backfill key positions (by
moving from one Wing/DRG to another) when people are promoted, retire, or
otherwise leave the organization -- limits flexibility.
Going back to PMRT type or relationship between AFMC development and
sustainment organizations. Worst decision was to take away the cradle-to-grave
management structure that put one belly button over organizations regardless if
they were development or sustainment!
Lack of culture change within work force, unethical leadership, lack of promotion
opportunities within Group
I can no longer identify what anyone does. It makes it harder to determine who is
in acquisition and who is not.
The removal of the term SPO is confusing to many people and we have to explain
it to our customers often.
Too few people to get the job done
Seeing others being promoted before me just because they work in a SPO while I
am in a support organization (Pricing). This is very disheartening to me and to all
Pricing personnel. No matter what we do we cannot win! Supervisors who rate
you the same as the person before--no matter what you accomplish. Even if you
have worked in all areas of contracting (SPO, Lab, etc.) and you have had the top
rating, whenever you move your rating goes down automatically and it tends to
stay there--not really fair at all!! It means you cannot compete with the SPO
personnel who tend to get top grades at all times.
Changes from SPOs to Group/Wings has done actually worsened an outsider's
ability to identify who does what within AFMC. Wing/Grp names are generic and
do not create the clear phonebook Gen Martin often alluded to. In addition, we
have now split the baby so many different ways (UMD, functional allocations and
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responsibilities); I feel we have significantly sub-optimized the Center's ability to
perform resource leveling. Ownership of authorizations by these new miniwings/grps has only exasperated the rice-bowls that existed under the SPO
organizations. The reorganization also has not been resource neutral with each
organization looking out for themselves, in that each new organization is
attempting to become self-sufficient. As a result, each commander is building a
support structure for the care and feeding of a smaller entity (compared to the
previous functional matrixed arrangement.) I could go on, but one can extrapolate
on the inefficiencies of taking larger organizations and breaking them up in to
numerous very small self sustaining entities.
Split responsibilities for similar systems (sustainment vs. development) resulting
in duplication of responsibilities and duplication of efforts.
Two areas - First, by standing up a wing level in the center organizational
structure, we added another layer of staffing, and sourced that staffing from the
old SPOs. Our overall line versus staff ratio has decreased, and the program
offices have loss billets and experience to set up the wing staffs. The group staffs
by and large are the old SPO staffs. Secondly, if we gave the Wing CC/Director
PEO authority for the lesser ACAT 3 programs, we could regain some of the
inefficiencies the new wing structure has levied on the center.
Consistent disagreement between Product and Logistics Centers regarding who
does what, who will take what and the definition of sustainment, acquisition,
development etc... Also not sure why we have stated that the Wing/CC is not in
the Acq chain of command -- why remove a link in the chain -- it's not like that in
Operational structures.
It is my opinion that we are now in the wing/group/squadron organizational
structure but we are still acting like SPOs. There are too many people who may
have been in the systems world too long or have never been in an operational
environment and as a result, they have no clue how the interaction between
wings/groups/squadrons really work...in an operational environment.
-Application of policy: development to development centers/sustainment to the
sustainment centers. -Lack of human resources at the product centers -Reluctance
to change
Size of work force needs to be addressed. Acq reform cut workforce to low.
People are getting OPRS, etc signed at lower levels. In the long run, this will be
good, but some people will be hurt during the change. Also, I don't think AFMC
has really figured out how they're going to treat command billets. In the rest of the
AF, it's a 2 yr billet, yet I'm being told I could stay in it for my whole assignment
(3-4 yrs). That would cheat other people of the opportunity to be a commander,
and commander jobs are usually limited to 2 yrs because people need a break.
Being a commander is significantly different than being a PM or SPD, but we're
still treating them as the same thing. My last concern is that organizations are not
standardized. What constitutes a group at one product center would only be a
squadron at another--no standard criteria ($$ amounts, number of people, number
of programs etc.) between product centers. Seems like it was based more on "How

106

•
•
•
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

many command billets did a product center get?"--let's organize around that
number.
We seem to have some kind of "change" every 2 to 4 years--but at the working
level, all that changes is nomenclature. Usually the change in names is a waste of
time and energy.
Not enough work and too many people to include SETA support.
increased levels of management have resulted in more micromanagement
Too many layers of management now. I.e. Flight leader, Squadron leader, Group
Leaders, Wing leaders, each with a staff and execs???, who is doing the work?.
All want briefed on program status, delays quick communication with user, all
outgoing info must be coordinated thru all levels.
-Chain of command, way too much management! -Dealing with other groups
(SPOs) and organizations is much more difficult. -It's harder now for others to
figure out what AFMC does! Numbering the groups complicates the problem
further.
Additional layers of bureaucratic management were added to justify additional
AF civilian supervisor positions. No value added. The management chain is
cumbersome, lethargic, and unwieldy. Responsibility and independent thinking is
not allowed without first checking with higher HQ. Squadron CC positions are
hollow and are name only dept titles, not real commanders like in a flying
squadron. No G-series orders nor orderly room authorized, hence the cc has no
UCMJ authority, which is the true test of command authority. Total
mismanagement of AFMC. Morale is lower than anytime before.
Incorporating all the "rah-rah"/legacy stuff which adds nothing to doing my job. I
served in combat units in my previous life so I know what legacy means.
Assigning combat unit designations to acquisition organizations doesn't change
the king's clothing--a SPO is still a SPO no matter what you call it; e.g., SPO
people don't get shot!!
User will eventually not have a clue on who to contact. If we're the "802 ASS"
(armament system sqdn), what does that mean to ACC if we're actually the JDAM
SPO. Old titles conveyed direct meaning on who we are. Remember, most
important connections are at worker level, not just GO's knowing which wing
commander to call...
One concern is placement of future programs that may not fit exactly into one of
the groups formed based on commonality of systems. I suppose if that situation
arises though, a new group can be formed to support that new program and new
capabilities.
International Squadron created under the Air to Ground Wing, however,
personnel were kept in the respective groups. International Squadron just added
another layer of coordination and one more staff meeting to attend and prepare
charts for--no value added.
Under new structure--seems like there are too many managers. We have
functional area managers at the group level (FM/PK/LG)(GS-14) and then at the
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wing functionals again (GS-15). Not really sure how the introduction of the wing
concept has help the group (formerly SPO) more productive.
The restructure into Wings, Groups, Squadron and Flights is a farce!!! This along
with the restructure at our using command ACC has really messed with the
workers' minds. We are still working with the same folks as before---they and we
just don't know who we are!!! The Group, Squadron and Flight office symbols
still have not changed. "Haven't been approved yet"????
People can not find people any more. It has been difficult locating people in other
organizations, not knowing what they are in now. I need to contact a lot of people
in different Org., and I have found this to be my worst area since reorg.
It appears to be a lot of resources unnecessarily expended............
Greatly increased overhead and associated oversight has decreased the ability to
respond in a timely manner
The exchange of information between weapons' groups and aircraft groups is still
not as effective or as efficient as is needed to meet the users' needs to defend our
country as quickly or as affordable as the taxpaying citizens deserve.
Under the new structure, the Wing/Group CC controls the UMD slots, removing
the functional home office from any decision regarding resources. Wing/Group
CCs have the best interests of THEIR organization at heart, rather than the best
interests of AAC. This results in fewer rotations of personnel for career
broadening, as the CCs now decide who they will allow to move and who they
will retain. Currently, there are NO individuals qualified to become PCOs in my
organization. There are several individuals in other organizations who are well
qualified, but cannot move because their CCs refuse to release them and the PK
home office, not having control of the UMD, cannot force a move. The Center
Commander has been unwilling to intervene. This results in more work for
existing PCOs, who must take-up the slack. We are now in a situation where we
will give warrants to the best candidate available, instead of the best candidate in
the Center.
No UCMJ authority for Wing /CCs, Additional layers of management, more
bloated staffs Wings are created to be able to be picked up and moved in their
entirety, Business organizations(and let's face it, AFMC is by and large a
business) are designed to share personnel and functional resources across
divisions without having to duplicate expertise and functions in each
organization. We've shoe-horned a business entity into an operational structure
and it doesn't fit. If one of the major reasons for restructuring was to look like the
rest of the AF so the war fighter’s would understand AFMC, wouldn't it have
made more sense to just educate the other commands?
I'm not sure of the value of the change to producing our products more efficiently.
It seems false reasoning to me to say that the acquisition field needs to "look like
the rest of the operational AF" so that they can better identify with us. While there
are advantages to the metric system, I don't have any trouble remembering that 12
inches are in a foot and 3 feet are in a yard.

108

•
•
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

See some duplication of effort between staffs and multiple wings; used to have
one office providing service, now that is duplicated in each wing.
All of the Centers still have their separate org's: whether it's a wing or a SPO, they
still work for an O-6 or GS-15. Hard to say that the reorg creates more effective
or efficient environment - it's probably the same, just with new (but better) names.
Insufficient training/mentoring of persons now in supervisory or "chain of
command" positions. The "system" did not groom people for these positions, thus
we will struggle with inexperienced (read inept in too many cases)people making
less than optimum decisions because they somehow think that position
equivocates to knowledge. It does not.
Front end planning prior to Milestone A is not consistently implemented. The
Organization structure is different at each of the Centers. The relationship of the
planning activity to the AFMC Commander vs the PEO is not clearly understood
or implemented. I do not think that the Jul 2003 Memo for Record signed by the
CSAF and SAF stating that "The Commander of AFMC is responsible for frontend planning prior to Milestone A as user's requirements are being defined..." is
understood by the users or well defined within AFMC as part of the AF
Capability Planning Process.
The General does not see himself as a tenant on another's installation, though
technically he is. And there's good reason for this--many view him as still
responsible for the installation, though technically he doesn't have authority.
Worse, with the reorganization of the Center, it is harder to get through to see
him. Where once we worked directly for him, now for some issues to see him I
have to meet first with a Director, the Group Commander and the ABW
commander, often in that order. This takes additional time and effort and yet
produces no greater benefit.
Changed for the wrong reasons. Saw the clamor for "Commander" and little else
changed about the overall attitude. Felt the Center commander and AFMC
Commander had sincere intentions. Too many opportunists morphed the
commanders' visions.
Creation of an additional level of bureaucracy with new Wing and Group
structure in addition to the former SPO structure, that is still there, just not called
"SPO". Removal of highly qualified people from former SPOs to populate the
Wing/Gp staffs Conflict with DP over grade structure based on number of direct
reports and conflict between functional and line-management organizations
caused by the reorganization
Need to use metrics to determine the quality and value of products produced; is
the customer satisfied? senior military officer turnover--too frequent resulting in
instability and a lack of continuity; the product centers need good, stable military
leadership from the commander down to the lieutenants
The original renaming of the organizations caused some confusion with our
warfighters in the field as well as the Army, Marines and Navy organizations we
deal with. The current approach of going to a numbered Air Force like the
operational commands is going to be much worse. I have had some very adverse
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feedback from my other service counterparts. A direct quote from an Army
person at Redstone Arsenal is "This is dumber than dirt". Titles are important and
the ability to immediately know what system the organization is responsible for
without consulting a master checklist (which may be unavailable or outdated) is
only part of the issue.
Many of the day-to-day tasks were over looked. Even though "wings, groups, and
squadrons" were established they are not complete. They do not have
commanders on "g-series" orders. Things like orderly rooms, first sergeants,
vehicle control officers and unit training managers were not considered. If your
wing does not have a VCO you may spend days looking around for a unit who
has one who is willing to sign your forms to get a government drivers license. As
a military person I still have to deal with multiple chains of command. For my
daily work assignments I may work for the "Air-To-Ground" wing commander.
However, for any legal issues I have to contact a first shirt and a commander in a
different unit’s orderly room who takes care of us as an additional task. Those are
just a few examples.
There are many, but I can't say I'm really concerned, as I plan to get out of here as
soon as I'm retirement-eligible.
All!!!
Loss of focus on program management by most senior/seasoned acquisition
professionals. Attention is constantly diverted to wing/group/squadron
responsibilities.
Don't know how the decision was made to identify an office as a wing vs. group
vs other -- based on dollars spent, political oversight, number of employees, etc.?
Affects how one feels about the office they are working in and potential
promotion opportunities.
Civilians are getting deputy positions rather than director positions. Looks like we
are going to all military for commanders of groups, wings, etc.
Long delays in restructure below wing level, and Center-level restructure still
pending -- organizational identities and individual contacts lost, org charts still
TBD, many interim and obsolete names and symbologies are still in use. Severely
limited my ability to maintain or re-establish "official" contacts, chains of
command. I think this whole exercise is another change for the sake of change. I
see no value whatsoever.
Hidden costs. The cost of the reorg has not been seen. There has already been
grade creep and increased layers of management put in place. As these
organizations mature staffs will become heavier because the "zero" growth rule
will be a thing of the past.
Turmoil in the workplace continues to degrade our ability to perform up to our
ability and desire. Define turmoil as the continuing flood of seemingly irrational
taskings, requirements, training, surveys and other distractions that prevent us
from sticking to Job #1 as outlined in our PD's.
We did not more easily identify ourselves to our customers; AQ still says - oh
yeah, you used to be SPO Yxxx. It was not resource neutral - whenever you build
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organizations, you build fiefdoms - you now have many fiefdoms conflicting with
functionals instead of a core functional staff supporting many offices focused on
producing a product. The reorg took the focus off the programs for some senior
acquisition folks.
This change was non value added from my view.
communication
The reorg has been extremely costly to both the programs and the people with
little to no benefit to show for it. Each program is being assessed to fund these
grotesque staffs at the wing & group level. I strongly feel that the Center, and the
program offices, functioned much much better under the old organizational
structure.
The Wing has seemed to place an additional layer of bureaucracy on top of the
program offices. When the DoD is trying to decentralize control of the programs,
their goal was to reduce bureaucracy, but the opposite has occurred.
The Wing they assigned my office to does NOT fit in with what we do
Do not know enough about what happened. I really didn't notice any difference.
Very difficult to understand what organization's new office symbols and
organizational alignment are.
Overhead has increased as a result of the re-org
There are a lot more layers of coordination/approval to go through; there seems to
be a lot more duplication of effort
Wing structure creates bureaucracy and overhead. The product center should be
run like a business or any other corporation, organized around product lines, and
focused on corporate profitability. For us corporate profitability is the ability to
field systems at the lowest cost possible. If it were up to me, product centers
would compete for work with other product centers.
o Geographically separated units that have no in-house legal support in
places where there should be day to day interaction with active program
offices. (2) The restructuring (both at the AFMC PC level and the PEO
level) has program offices going through more layers of management then
ever before. For instance, you have DFSG/PN going to DFSG and through
its structure, to OSSW and its structure, and then finally to ESC proper
and its structure. (3) The delegations from the PEO or the commander
levels have become difficult to figure out.
The reorganization created another level of bureaucracy that adds no significant
value to mission accomplishment.
Structure of the OSSW Wing! Too large (span of control) for coordination
matters -- too many layers -- too spread out. Needs to be examined and
reconfigured -- maybe even divided into "2" parts.
Too many layers of Bureaucracy NO LG/A4 at ESC No Logistics Emphasis at
any level. All/Most ESC Logisticians are contractors (95%)
There is nothing intuitive about the changes. Nothing seems to flow in a logical
way. The standard structure is being forced on an organization which is in fact
different from the operational Air Force.

111

•

•
•

•
•
•

•
•
•

•

•
•
•

We're trying to integrate a Tactical Datalink Network (TDN) "capability" on all
USAF Platforms. However, the Platforms don't recognize the shift from Platform
based integration to Capability based integration. Many, if not all, of the Platform
PM's do not appreciate our involvement in "their" Platform. Their lack of
cooperation inhibits our ability to substantiate/defend the funding required to
integrate this capability into their Platform, as result we constantly have our
funding cut which adversely affects the Platforms. The TDN AFI and the TDN
AFPD, which defines MAJCOM roles and responsibilities, needs to be signed at
the highest levels to mandate cooperation ASAP.
How does this action keep the AF relevant with regard to current events facing
the nation?
Reorg cannot fully accomplish goals of integration because of the nature of the
funding system. Not an issue with reorg per se, but something that should be
tackled at the higher levels. We are going after the personnel system (NSPS) so
let's revamp the PPBS next!
SETA contractors making and influencing decisions that are in their best interest,
not the USAF.
My functional used to be a matrix. The reorg has created little dictatorships, and
added another level to the reporting/suspense chain.
It was bad enough when we had to learn the new Wing/Group naming
convention, but now I heard we are scraping that for a numbering identifying
naming convention. I hope this isn't going to be something similar to TQM or
other poorly executed management decisions.
Yes a major area of concern is that its not a full integration with the operational
world. We only go as far as Sqd CC's? Why is that? Is there a reason we do not
want our junior officers (Maj and Capts) to have Flight Commander status?
I was present for a realignment of test centers within AAC and significant
downgrading of positions within the civilian workforce occurred.
There is more bureaucracy and layers of management to get through then there
were before the reorg. My chain of command hasn't changed because I'm in a
Staff organization; however, I hear all the grumblings of those in the program
offices and how their workload has increased because of more levels of
management. Things take longer to get through the red tape now than they did
before because more people are involved in the process.
The redesignation of SPOs to wings and groups provided for numerous wings
with only several hundred people assigned to each, an unnecessary proliferation
of wing-level units. I believe a better approach would have to create an
acquisition wing at each product center in which the SPOs would have been
groups.
Positions and functional areas have been created to "save" jobs as opposed to
streamline the business.
Civilian "Commanders" of Wings/Groups/Squadrons.
Too much work load, not enough people to do the job. Need to stabilize
organizations titles.
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Staffing a package to AQ now requires heroic efforts--AQ has to be "informally"
checked with before the PEO signs. There are still the un-clear lines of command,
and petty food fight between AFMC and AQ. We need a clear chain of command
in the field. The reorg didn't do it--made it less clear
Too few workers for increasing work requirements, poor quality physical work
environment, increased mandatory requirements [time consumers: mandatory
trainings, audits, defending audit findings] equals decreased amount of time to get
the work done. Drastically less mil, A&AS and civ manpower, high turnover of
military members, loss of experienced civilian workers to other State and Federal
orgs and to commercial jobs. Training and technology doesn't make up for
eroding quantity of resources.
The new Wing Structure was put in place, which placed another level of overhead
in between the SPD and the PEO. This additional administrative overhead was not
budgeted for (or at least appeared not to be), and the "Group" organizations were
expected to provide funds to pay for this new structure. Additionally, I'm in an
organization that resides under a Group, but was not identified as a Squadron, so
we are still a division. If the reorganization was meant to emulate the standard,
Wing/Group/Squadron structure, then what does our user/warfighter think a
"Division" is? Finally, a cross reference matrix of organizational name and
responsibility changes. Before I could find people in the global in a particular
organization because I knew what aircraft platform they supported. With the
change to "Numbered" organizations, it is not readily evident whom that
individual is working for.
The reorganization has still not been fully completed. ESC. PK and FM
functional still refuse to fully comply with the AFMC CONOPS. They still
control all of the Contracting and Finance personnel as if they were there own
instead of the Wing to which they are assigned. Wings are dabbling in execution
when they should be focused on organizing and equipping. Our UMD is still not
where it should be and the POM process was a disaster.

79 respondents selected “no answer” to this question.
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Appendix K: Answers to Survey Question Number 74
Question 74. Please tell us anything else about your experience with the 2004 AFMC
Product Center reorganization that you think we should know for future reorganization
improvement.
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Too many name changes in such a short time has only added to confusion within
and outside the Command. Our warfighter Command counter parts, at least from
my experience, find the numerous name changes our attempt to look like them
amusing. They also have the perception we reorg'd to mask our faults -- Druyan
backlash.
A survey such as this should be performed ahead of the change. This would allow
the people expected to make the change and eventually benefit from it to voice
their opinions. The results should be carefully considered before making
sweeping changes to organizational structure. I was very disappointed when I
arrived at AFMC to find out that there was a MAJCOM change which was going
thru seemingly without any support or input from the people it affected. Also,
during all of my inprocessing, no one ever mentioned a reorganization. AFMC
should be spreading the word at each base either in person or electronically.
It seems that we make these changes to be known for something different as we
progress through our career. I have seen all kinds of reorganizations and changes.
The Air Force is in a cycle. Each person would like to leave his mark without
checking historical data prior to making the decision. Changing to numbers has
no reality for an acquisition environment. I do believe that moving the PEO's
closer to the field was a good idea.
The realignment of management was helpful, but changing the names to numbers
will not get us anywhere. Numbers are not descriptive to the human mind.
Imagine if we went by social security numbers instead of names.
Communication of the changes was handled well. Believe the key is to tell early
what is planned and continue giving updates on the status of the reorganization.
In my years with AFMC I have witnessed a re-organization / change in strategic
focus about every 2-3 years. How successful would a large firm be if they
changed their strategic focus every 2-3 years. It takes that long to simply
implement the changes. I realize that the world is changing very quickly and we
must adapt to this to remain on top, but so must every private business also. We
must develop a strategic business focus that can be executed and not discarded
every 2-3 years and focus our energies on flexing with the changing threat
environment. A productive, learning organization not focused on names,
commanders, etc can be created and I think we can grow and improve far beyond
the "clear phonebook", "Business Area", or "Mission Area" concepts. AFMC is
part of a military organization, but it is the business arm of the AF and by
definition is different than the Tip of the Sword and it difference should become
it's strength not it's weakness as many allude.
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Better define the interface between organizations such that MOAs and
Memorandum of Agreements are not needed for specific programs.
Desire HQ AFMC to step forward to adjudicate manpower positions when work
transfers. It should not be the responsibility for one center to agree, disagree,
approve or disapprove of the quantity and mix another center has stated they need
to execute a mission.
-Be consistent- the more you allow for exceptions to policy the more meaningless
all this reorganization becomes.
AFMC needs more field experienced logisticians in the acquisitions process.
Acquisition Reform cut the working levels to low and we lost a large portion of
our experience personnel. We need to return to the manpower levels and core
knowledge of how Air Force operates when dealing with both active base units
and dealing with the acquisition process
I still think the main redeeming quality of the reorg will be to define a baseline
program office size and then use that to drive billet moves between organizations
as work loads change.
Let's go back to SPOs to define functional areas. At least we'll know who does
what and who to contact to work together!
Seems to me the Wing/Group/Squadron structure is another way to provide jobs
for additional senior gov't/civilian folks. From the bottom looking up, I don't see
what our SES wing guy adds to the process. People get things done--not
organizations.
By creating Wg/Gp/Sq, you've created a "pecking order" on which SPO's are
more important than others. ACC may not always feel that way. If resources fall
according to your title (i.e., top folks go to Gp over Sq, or Wg over Gp), user may
not get the support they require from a SPO.
Very few people were having any problems with the structure of the Product
Centers with the possible exception of Operational Members sitting on Promotion
Boards. But then, they have problems accepting the importance of their own
Commands non flying jobs. This probably could have been better accomplished
by educating the folks on the Promotion Boards of the involvement and
responsibilities of the non flying jobs.
Don't assume that reorganization equals progress...........
Competition and recognition among the squadrons, groups and wings are good as
long as the common good for all is not lost.
The functional home offices are dinosaurs; relics of the past, serving no useful
purpose. Their past function was to ensure the Center had the functional resources
necessary to get the job done. With the new structure, the CCs have a very
myopic viewpoint, caring little for the Center well-being. They should either be
eliminated to save resources, or should have their responsibilities restored. 2. The
justification for the AFMC reorganization was eyewash. The true reason for this
reorganization will only be known by the AFMC leadership. While the warfighter
might no understand SPOs, they didn't need to. ACC understood the organization
very well, and served as the go-between for the warfighter and SPOs. I will never
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understand why every new Commander believes a new organizational structure
will ensure their legacy, when improving the efficiency and accountability is what
really counts. The new organization does neither. We are making changes for the
sake of making changes.
I noticed that the reorganization seemed to place the PEO back at the Center
Level, just like it was in the '70s. So, took us 30yrs to go full circle. I guess this
means that in 2030 the PEO (or whatever the position is called then) will be
moved back to the Pentagon, so save yesterday's organizational charts.
Be more discriminating when selecting persons for flight/group/wing commander.
Rank and time in grade does not equal competence. Some people should be left as
Majors or GS-9s. We have only started to feel the negative effects of the reorg.
In the last 4 years our organization has changed name and structure 3 times. More
energy and management time and effort went into reorganization than acquisition
Accountability is not there. A foundation without firm, concise and understood
"simple metrics" will evolve to entropy.
It would be useful to start looking at organizational structure from the bottom up
rather than the top down. After all, it's the people on the bottom who actually do
the work. If you want to enhance efficiency, try it that way. The current structure
is all about the prestige, convenience and careers of the SES'ers and GO's (and
those who want to be SES and GO). It does not fool most of us at all.
These constant reorg's waste time and resources. They cause confusion here and
with others. They cause extra layers of management and build new empires, all of
which, costs money, time, and resources. They also lower moral and cause more
work for the rank and file.
Having worked many years in operational MAJCOMs, I feel those customers
would have never wanted such a large level of AFMC resources focused on this
reorg. They weren't from my perspective ever terribly uncomfortable with the
previous arrangement. The XP and XR communities knew who was supporting
them. Their concern continues to be cost, schedule and performance.
Slower is not necessarily better! It has taken a ridiculously long time for someone
to decide how to create squadrons and flights within acquisition and other nonflying wings -- probably because of the forced superposition of a flying wing
structure on non-operational entities. The Navy never seemed to have a problem
understanding the differences between sea and shore organizations and billets,
and inherently fundamental differences in missions and functions. The Army
seems to do just fine without calling their acquisition and logistics functions
brigades or battalions. Our next big reorganization will probably being before this
one is complete. These events regularly occur on 5-7 year cycles.
Convert AFMC to almost entirely civilian. I highly respect military individuals
but the need for military in this command is almost non existent. The military
billets could be better used in the operational commands. AFMC should probably
become an agency and run under civilian control to provide goods and services
for the warfighter, not occupy the warfighter in day to day non military functions.
Funding and Strengthening IT
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The power structure is now more lopsided than ever. The Wings offer no value
added to the acquisition & execution of the program. The Wings have turned into
nothing more than these huge dynasties.
Most enjoy their job, but get frustrated by the multiple "taskers" for information.
Most ask for similar things, but not exactly the same. You get tasked from SAF,
then the functional, but then get something a little different from the CC, and
again, more tasks from Wing, Group. Their needs to be one single funnel for
information. Just because a task has Finance in the title, doesn't mean that it’s a
Finance task, but that is what happens. If it deals with the program, the Program
Manager should answer, if it deals with contracting, PK should answer.
Get the information out to all and request comments & concerns. I felt that no one
cared about the workers and that this was something that the disconnected bosses
forced on us.
Too many changes from initial briefed plan to final outcome (and it still isn't
complete as Wing names have not yet been changed to numbered Wings).
Organic Manpower was not provided to stand up the Wings, three of the four
"new" wing staffs are full of contractor support, increasing the overhead costs for
the center....
o I believe that if you are going to orient based on capabilities, then the
organizations have to be collocated to provide for an opportunity to crossfertilize and learn from each other on a day to day basis. (2) The GSUs,
even with technology, are greatly disadvantaged by the fact that few
employees ever see their Product Center Commanders or their staffs on a
regular basis. (3) Activities, such as source selections and contract review,
become harder and harder to maintain to do because of the cost of travel
that is necessary and is not planned into the overall process. (4) Real
consolidation (i.e., moving bodies to where the work really is) has to
follow re-organization.
Don't attempt to artificially overlay an operation structure onto what had been
properly organized on a "business organization" model.
Use the KISS Principle Follow the REORG Rules or Don't Reorganize! Too
much Political and Bureaucratic Management layers
Try to come up with easier to understand/remember unit identifications.
Platforms don't recognize the shift from Platform based integration to Capability
based integration. Many, if not all, of the Platform PM's do not appreciate our
involvement in "their" Platform. Their lack of cooperation inhibits our ability to
substantiate/defend the funding required to integrate this capability into their
Platform, as result we constantly have our funding cut which adversely affects the
Platforms. The TDN AFI and the TDN AFPD, which defines MAJCOM roles and
responsibilities, needs to be signed at the highest levels to mandate cooperation
ASAP.
Keep organizations properly manned, if we are not, it inhibits our ability to
capitalize of any "new and improved" method.
More consideration for integration among systems.
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A squadron is defined more by the activities and interaction that happen outside
of the mission. We need more Cols and Lt Cols that will spend time with the
troops, in an informal setting.
Keep people better informed.
With limited resources being separated into Wings / Groups, how about forcing
the Wing Commanders and Group Commanders to play nice together? It is way to
often the case that they are empire building and can't play together in the same
sand box. Get rid of the grey hairs that can't adjust to change and remind these
over zealous commanders that they work for the US Air Force and not for them
selves. It is very embarrassing to see and hear how childish these Colonels, SES's
and GO's have been behaving!! Get with the program...you work as a team and
get the job done! Then you can go home and build your empire in your private
life.
Yes this goal day thing is silly. The basis of allowing personnel to have a day off
based on the actions of senior leadership sounds like a broke process. Give your
people time off...you certainly can't affect their pay. Overall I think the command
could learn a lot from ACC, AMC and PACAF on how to take care of their troops
better. Work load compared to manning here is definitely not balanced. Some
offices work 6 day weeks while others have time to give off. Some worked
through the holidays while other offices were able to tell people to "go home and
just stay local".
A new commander = reorganization. The only variable is the degree of the
magnitude of the reorganization. Relearning and training take a significant level
of resources.
The reorganization was supposed to be "resource neutral." However, it has not
worked out that way and there were new positions established and new
contractors hired to do the new tasks that were previously done elsewhere (i.e.,
resource management at the Wing level vs. centrally at the Functional area level.)
I came in on the tail end of the current reorganization. I heard a lot of "...it was
better back then because...."; however, overall everyone picked up the new
organization. You have to be careful to not loose functionality in the
reorganization. Some crucial cross functional integration activities can get lost in
the reorganization with everyone thinking that this will be taken up by a different
office. Ensure that functionality still exists with information cross flow.
Realign manpower, which was totally neglected in reorg.
Good communication on upcoming changes.
Wing/group/squadron initiative is a good idea, but devil is in the details. There is
now another layer of management (the wing) when it wasn't there before. Staff
work has increased dramatically. Resources the same--Three reasons people fail
per Gen Martin--lack of resources (yes--same job, more management, more work,
people being pulled off programs out of hide to man the new and growing staffs),
training (no real problems here--you have a bunch of heroes in the workforce who
will succeed in spite of the every-other-year change the names reorgs for reorg
sake), and guidance (very poor guidance--who is the boss? Who should I be loyal
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to--my program, my group, my wing, the PEG, the PEO, SAF/AQ? So, the reorg
exacerbated our already existing resource problem and muddied the water on
guidance. Guess what--we will succeed anyway, and I love my job and the AF-will keep coming to work to field systems to the warfighter in spite of all this
mess. That is what is important anyway.
I think you're on the right track with the reorg...just need bodies to do the work.
Cross-reference matrix of old organization name to new organization
name/number.
At least at the lower levels, there is still a huge resistance to adapt to the Wing,
Group, and Sq structure. Communications and tasking still come in from multiple
directions and responses do not always get fully coordinated. Empire building is
still a big problem. Our Group still is trying to figure out how they can bring more
business in and not on how they can deliver the capabilities they've already been
tasked to procure better, cheaper and faster.

110 respondents selected “no answer” for this question.
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Appendix L: Acronyms Used
AAC – Air Armament Center
AE – Acquisition Center of Excellence
AF – Air Force
ABW – Air Base Wing
AFMC – Air Force Materiel Command
ALC – Air Logistics Center
ASC – Aeronautical Systems Center
DO – Operations Directorate
DoD – Department of Defense
DR – Requirements Directorate
EN – Engineering Directorate
ESC – Electronic Systems Center
FY – Fiscal Year
IN – Intelligence
LG – Logistics and Sustainment Directorate
MAJCOM – Major Command
MS – Mission Support Directorate
PC – Product Center
PEO – Program Executive Officer
SES – Senior Executive Service
SPSS – Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, Version 13.0
ST – Science and Technology
TR – Transformation Directorate
XR – Capabilities Integration Directorate
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